Review Article:
Allied Intervention and the Russian Civil War, 1917-1922


The Allied intervention in the Russian civil war and indeed the civil war itself have been the subject of a massive body of literature dating back to the 1920s. From the beginning, Soviet and western historians have argued about the motives and objectives of the Allied powers, about the reasons for the failure of the anti-Bolshevik movement, and conversely about the reasons for the Soviet victory in the civil war. Allied intervention, of course, was a bungled affair impeded at first by the demands of the Great War and then by profound war-weariness after the Armistice of November 1918. Widespread popular sympathy for the besieged and blockaded state, and post-war mass dissidence in Europe, also checked the efforts of the Allied governments to overthrow the Bolsheviks.

Even with limited foreign intervention, the civil war was bloody and destructive. Those who did not perish on the battlefield or fall victim to the Red or White Terrors might as easily have succumbed to disease, cold, and
hunger. The revolution and civil war also ripped apart the social structure of pre-war Tsarist Russia; by 1921, when the Soviet government finally snuffed out the last remains of armed resistance, Russia was in ruins. All four of the books reviewed here contribute to our understanding of these matters.

Michael Kettle's study of Allied intervention in 1918 is part of a projected five-volume series to end with the disengagement of the British government from the civil war in March 1920. The first volume of the work appeared in 1981 and some reviewers were sharply critical of its lack of organization, direction, and analytical framework. The second volume has the same problems with long, undigested, and indigestible narratives of British war cabinet meetings. Chapter contents often do not bear any relation to chapter titles; indeed, the same criticism could be levelled at the book's title 'Russia and the Allies', as no use has been made of the readily available French or United States archives, or of many of the secondary sources on the policies of the various Allies. The book is for the most part about British policy and British war cabinet views in particular.

It must be said, however, that other authors writing on the intervention have assumed that the policy of one of the Allied powers was that of all of them. What comes out of Kettle's book, and it is a pity that he did not choose to put more emphasis on the point, is that not only were the Allies unable to devise a common policy towards the Bolshevik revolution, but they were deeply suspicious of one another, often seeking to prevent one another from gaining political or economic advantage in Russia. Kettle's long narratives of war cabinet discussions make it obvious that the British government itself could not agree on policy towards the Bolsheviks. Nor was the British government any different than its French and US counterparts. The essential question for all three was whether to ally with the Bolsheviks against the common German enemy, or whether to seek to overthrow the Soviet government. Kettle does not explore these policy differences either within the British government or among the Allies; but he does show the persistent efforts of the wily British prime minister, David Lloyd George, to explore the possibilities of co-operating with the Bolsheviks against Germany. In this he was opposed, among others, by Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Milner, and Lord Curzon, as well as by permanent officials of the foreign and war offices. Clearly, wheels were turning within wheels here, but the author, regrettably, does not attempt to explain or interpret them.

The origins of the decision to intervene in Russia, of course, have prompted considerable debate among historians. Did the Allies intervene against the Bolsheviks because they were revolutionaries who threatened Allied political and economic interests, or because the Soviet government made peace with the Central Powers in March 1918, thus freeing large numbers of German troops for a massive spring offensive on the Western Front? In Kettle's first volume he observes that 'the only hope ... [of thwarting this German menace] was to restore the Eastern Front with Allied troops – by Allied military intervention in Russia'. Kettle thus appears to corroborate the views of Richard H. Ullman in his first volume on British intervention published in 1961. This is somewhat ironic as Kettle sets out to show that Ullman, who did not have access to British archival sources apart from Milner's and William Wiseman's papers, missed a good deal of the story, and the irony is compounded by the fact that Kettle appears to have stumbled on the evidence necessary to show that Ullman's interpretation requires serious modification.

Some of this evidence is to be found in Kettle's first volume, in which he shows that British military intelligence correctly perceived that the restoration of military resistance to Germany in Russia would be impossible: reports in early 1918, and earlier in fact, concluded that Russia should be counted out of the war. Of all the Russian political groups, however, the Bolsheviks seemed the most formidable: Lloyd George believed that they represented a serious menace to the Central Powers, and were capable of leading a guerrilla war against German forces in Russia.

Kettle's second volume continues to follow the debates in which Cecil and Milner led the opposition to Lloyd George. The debates occasionally 'got rather hot' as the British discussed 'fundamentals, the rights of property, etc'. Milner, a staunch anti-Bolshevik, at times advocated peace with Germany at Russia's expense, while Cecil feared that the revolution might not be 'catching' only in Germany. Foreign office officials opposed cooperation with the Bolsheviks – 'because we shall undoubtedly alienate most of the elements in Russia whose support we require for the restoration of order' – and A.J. Balfour, the British foreign secretary, was reluctant to co-operate with them for fear of facilitating a military force geared to 'world-wide social revolution', a fear shared by both the US and French

6 Ibid., p. 179.
governments. Unlike Milner and Cecil, Balfour preferred a policy of ‘drift’; neither peace nor war with the Bolsheviks.7

Lloyd George of course was the pre-eminent ‘drifter’, but in this instance he appears to have persistently opposed the ‘interventionists’. In the spring of 1918, rapidly evolving events in Russia would defeat his efforts, but he seems to have lost no opportunity either then or at various times between the Armistice in November 1918 and the spring of 1922 to come to terms with the Bolsheviks. As his cabinet secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, noted in April 1918, ‘the PM has very stubbornly and adroitly resisted the pressure from the Foreign Office and War Office to rush the Japs to “down” the Bolsheviks’ (p. 63).

In effect, military action by the Japanese army in the Far East and by the pro-Allied Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia were the principal means by which British interventionists sought to overthrow the Bolsheviks. Japan, which had joined the Allied coalition in 1914 in order to seize German possessions in China and the Pacific, had the only sizeable force available for intervention in eastern Siberia. The Czechoslovak Legion, formed in 1917 from Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, was supposed to fight the Germans, but in May 1918 ended up fighting the Bolsheviks. Kettle does not explore these developments, but instead mistakenly accuses the French government of ‘duplicity’ with regard to the use of Czech troops. In fact the French general staff wanted the Czechs brought to France for use on the Western Front; it was British interventionists who ‘double-crossed’ the French by seeking to embroil the Czechs with Soviet authorities.

A ‘revisionist’ history of British intervention in Russia has thus yet to be written, but Kettle’s book certainly provides the leads for such a work. The possibility of co-operating with the Bolsheviks against Germany had influential proponents in both the British and French governments and was more than just George F. Kennan’s ‘wraith’ of collaboration.8 To answer the question why collaboration failed is in essence to determine the origins of the intervention.

On the other hand, the reprint of Richard Luckett’s The White Generals deals with the Allied intervention only in passing and focuses on the anti-Bolshevik military resistance to the Soviet government. Luckett begins his story with the fall of the Tsarist government in March 1917, describing the revolution as a police action gone wrong: the Cossacks, on whom the tsar traditionally relied to put down the population, ‘had not brought their whips’, the mob got out of hand, and the tsar was forced to abdicate. From that moment, ‘the Russian war effort was doomed’ (pp. 30, 36).

7 Ibid., pp. 151, 167-8.
The Russian Civil War

The Bolshevik revolution was not, however, ‘inevitable’; it was due to the incompetence and lack of vision of the Provisional Government which assumed power after the tsar’s abdication and then prematurely announced land reform. Discipline in the army disappeared, as Russian peasant soldiers thought only of returning home ‘to grab’ their share of the landlord’s property. When the Bolsheviks seized power in November 1917, there was little resistance; indeed, the ‘indifference [of the army] made the whole thing possible’ (p. 92). The new Soviet government still had to deal with the war, and faced with the collapse of discipline in the Russian army, was compelled to sue for peace. The civil war sprang from this circumstance.

Luckett describes the early campaigns of the Volunteer Army, top-heavy with officers demanding posts equivalent to those they had held before the revolution. Even the ranks of common soldiers were made up for the most part of former tsarist officers. But from these difficult beginnings the Volunteer Army grew to 100,000 men in 1919; the White Army in Siberia reached a similar size.

The rising of the Czechoslovak Legion made possible the anti-Bolshevik movement in Siberia, ‘at once be[coming] the predominant factor in Siberian politics’. Not only the British war office thought to use the Czechoslovak Legion against the Bolsheviks; certain junior Czech officers agitated for an attack on Soviet authorities in collusion with local anti-Bolshevik groups. The Czech uprising precipitated the Allied intervention, which Luckett characterizes as ineffective, but was nevertheless important in certain respects. The Allies, particularly the British, supplied great quantities of war matériel to the anti-Bolshevik armies, although much of it never reached those for whom it was intended, but instead ended up in the hands of corrupt anti-Bolshevik officials who sold it off to the highest bidder.

Corruption, as Luckett points out, was rampant in the anti-Bolshevik movement, much more so than on the Soviet side. The Allies having blockaded Soviet Russia, the Bolsheviks had little to steal, but there was another important difference between the two sides: the anti-Bolsheviks lacked the discipline and commitment of their adversaries, and so failed to attract the same number of recruits. Peter Kenez, writing after Luckett, aptly notes that while the Bolsheviks fought the civil war believing in the possibility of a better society, their adversaries regarded it not as a heroic struggle, but as a ‘nightmare’ to be survived as well as one could. Their hatred of the Bolsheviks and their desire for victory were intense, but ‘their hatred allowed for a degree of cynicism which led to corruption’.9

Allied observers saw the corruption, and were disgusted. The anti-Bolsheviks felt they were not getting enough support and demanded not

only more supplies, but also Allied troops: the British and French governments, whose war-weary soldiers had no taste for fighting in Russia, were unable to comply. Under the circumstances, British and French officers in Russia quickly became contemptuous of and condescending to the anti-Bolsheviks who seemed to them to prefer drinking and whoring to fighting the Red Army.

The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, exploited the Allied intervention to lift the morale of their partisans and give patriotic meaning to their struggle. 'Here were the imperialists', as Luckett puts it, 'ravening for booty, using civil strife as an excuse for the invasion of Russia.' The Bolsheviks drove home this image, truer perhaps than Luckett believes, and succeeded in consolidating their popular support. The intervention thus may have 'served the Reds better than it served those whom it was intended to assist' (p. 173).

In the short run, however, as Luckett notes, Allied military assistance intensified the civil war in 1919. Luckett gives an account of the campaigns that determined the fate of the revolution, as the upper hand in the fighting shifted from one side to the other in strike and counter-strike by the two sides. The principal antagonists were General A.I. Deniken and Admiral A.V. Kolchak, leaders of the main counter-revolutionary forces, and L.D. Trotsky, commissar of war and leader of the Red Army. Kolchak, attacking from western Siberia, and Denikin from the south, advanced on the Bolsheviks in central Russia. The Red Army gave ground, but was not defeated, striking back first in Siberia and then in southern Russia. In early 1920 Kolchak was captured and executed; Denikin was driven into the sea at Novorossiisk and forced into exile.

For Luckett the civil war was fought between two factions: 'the rest of the population really had no idea what it was being fought about' (p. 179). The Bolsheviks won because of their greater commitment and their better organization. Blockaded by the Allied powers, the Soviet government resorted to a system of requisition that came to be known as 'War Communism': it alienated the peasantry, who saw their grain stores seized to feed, and then only barely, the cities where Bolshevik popular support was greatest. But the Red Army was kept fighting to victory.

On the other side, the anti-Bolsheviks were not only corrupt, but incompetent and indiscriminately brutal. In Siberia, repression against the civilian population led to the development of a partisan movement, which severely hampered Kolchak's retreat in the autumn of 1919, while in the south the maverick anarchist Nestor Ivanovich Makhno ran amok behind Denikin's lines. Staffs were top-heavy with officers who had little competence and less taste for fighting. When the collapse came, it came quickly: by the end of March 1920 all that was left of the once-numerous armies of the counter-
revolution was a small force holding out in the Crimea, and the ragged debris of Kolchak’s forces fleeing towards Vladivostock.

Luckett tells the story of the civil war rather well. One might disagree with some of his interpretations: certainly the revolution had far more profound causes than the Cossacks’ forgetting their whips in Petrograd. His comments on Allied policy are at times oversimplified or wrong, but then his study is about the civil war, not the intervention. Certainly White Generals provides a useful context to the civil war diaries kept by Alexis Vasilevich Babine and Iurii Vladimirovich Got’e, and edited by Donald J. Raleigh and Terence Emmons respectively.

The diaries have been well edited, though Raleigh occasionally permits a soupçon of anti-Communism to influence his historical analysis. Emmons should be congratulated for an extraordinarily well-edited and beautifully translated work. He succeeds splendidly in capturing Got’e’s cynicism and his marvellous if savage images of the Bolsheviks. Raleigh’s was the less difficult task in that Babine wrote in English; but Emmons’s may have been the more enjoyable in that Got’e wrote with greater verve and imagery.

Babine was born in 1866 to parents who were ‘modestly well off and educated’. Got’e, seven years younger, was the son of a Moscow bookseller of French origin. Both were well-educated: Babine lived for twenty years in the United States and even studied at Cornell University in the 1890s; Got’e attended Moscow University, working under V.O. Kliuchevskii and other prominent Russian historians. At the time of the revolution Babine was an inspector of public schools in the province of Vologda; Got’e taught history in Moscow and was head librarian at the Rumiantsev Museum. After the abdication of the tsar Babine appears to have run afoul of the revolution. He left his post in Vologda and ended up in the Volga provincial capital of Saratov, where he taught English at the local university.

Babine and Got’e had much in common. Both were élitists of the professional Russian middle class, and both were politically conservative, though neither was involved in politics, which probably explains why they escaped the Bolshevik state security police (Cheka). Both were western-oriented; and each was critical of Russia’s backwardness and of what he believed to be its political immaturity and lack of patriotism. In many ways both were good representatives of Russia’s conservative classes: neither was sympathetic to the revolution; both cordially hated Bolshevism and earnestly hoped for its speedy demise. In both men, anti-Bolshevism was accompanied by a typical conservative Russian anti-Semitism.

For them the revolution was no heroic undertaking of the masses, but rather a ‘Time of Troubles’ similar to the period of civil war and disorder in Russia at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Got’e often refers to the revolution as ‘our Time of Troubles’. Neither liked the rough-mannered,
obscene, ‘ill-smelling’ Red Army men – the ‘tovarishchi’, or comrades, the ‘rabble’ and ‘scum’ of the revolution. To Got’e, the Bolsheviks were ‘gorillas’ and their revolution a ‘rampage’ of chaos and destruction. In June 1918 he wrote that ‘the tsardom of the gorillas is felt everywhere, a giant cage in which there is no refuge from the enraged beasts’ (p. 165). Babine was not quite as vivid in his diary, but his loathing for the Bolsheviks was just as intense.

The most striking similarity between the diaries of Babine and Got’e is the minute record of the destruction of their heretofore comfortable middle-class existence. Both commented frequently on Bolshevik requisitions and the nationalization of housing, goods, private enterprises, and so on. Got’e lost his apartment in Moscow and his modish country house. There were increasingly severe shortages of goods, food, and fuel. The simplest necessities of life were difficult to obtain, as inflation ran out of control and the paper rouble became nearly worthless. Shortages and generalized chaos led to the spread of typhus and cholera, depending on the season of the year. Got’e lost his wife, and recorded the deaths of many friends and acquaintances. Babine’s entries are similar. And yet life went on: Got’e went to a thesis defence; Babine was disappointed to miss a class. Their observations, reminiscent of the writings of Pasternak, Sholokov, Serafimovich, and Babel, are a record of reality for men living on the losing end of a class war.

While there are many similarities between the diaries of Babine and Got’e, there are also striking differences. Babine’s entries are almost completely concerned with day-to-day life in the Saratov area; he hardly mentions the war, the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the foreign intervention, or the Russo-Polish campaign of 1920. This may be due in part to Saratov’s being so far from the centre of the revolution. Got’e, on the other hand, was in Moscow, virtually rubbing shoulders with Bolshevik leaders like M.N. Pokrovskii and A.V. Lunacharskii. Much more than Babine, he decried the lack of ‘general-Russian patriotism’. In August 1917 he wrote, ‘the Russian slobs continue to search for fleas on themselves while the Germans are putting a noose around their neck. Pitiful wretches! My mood is such that I don’t want to see anyone.’ Or earlier, ‘we are only fit to be manure for peoples of higher culture ... The war is lost, and any future for what remains of Russia has been cut off at the root by the revolution! Thievery reigns’ (pp. 28, 40, 53).

After the Bolsheviks seized power, Got’e fell deeper into despair: ‘The motherland has died; there is no more motherland.’ When the peace negotiations with Germany at Brest-Litovsk began in December 1917, Got’e took grim satisfaction: ‘The Germans have again put the squeeze on the Russo-yid traitors and fools [that is, the Bolsheviks] and are putting them under the yoke’ (pp. 81, 94). What is more shocking than Got’e’s bitter
The Russian Civil War

anti-Semitism is his suggestion that it would be better to be governed by Germans than by Bolsheviks. 'Bolshevism ... is so savage and oppressive that even the domination of the mailed German fist seems a lesser evil than the rampage of the Russian gorillas. It is terrible to admit this, even to oneself' (p. 109). There is an entry in Babine's diary that suggests he would have agreed. A good many Russian liberals and conservatives shared such views, including Got'e's former teacher P.N. Miliukov: 'You catch yourself hating the Bolsheviks more than Germanism' (p. 112). Got'e concluded that the Bolsheviks would remain in power 'for a very long time', having decided even earlier that it would take outsiders, 'some as yet unknown Varangians', to put an end to the revolution.

Got'e was dismayed to hear in March 1918 of French officers aiding the Bolsheviks to form an army against Germany; an Allied 'flirtation', as he called it, which might estrange the Russian bourgeoisie and throw it into the arms of Germany. Such views, of course, quickly reached the Allies and contributed to the failure of Allied-Soviet collaboration. But Got'e did not trust the Allies any more than he did the Germans, thinking they might eventually partition Russia among themselves. It was only natural, he thought, 'to cut up the cadaver'. Surprisingly, Got'e evoked what he called a 'satanic syllogism' speculating that Russia might be better off if Germany won the war. The Allies would not agree to the establishment of a 'strong and intelligent monarchy'; only Germany could provide this. Such was Got'e's despair that in less than a year his strong Russian nationalism had given way to the acceptance of any foreign domination in preference to that of the 'gorillas'.

When French troops landed at Odessa at the end of 1918, Got'e was encouraged; when they pulled out in April 1919, he was disappointed and confused: 'the policy of the Allies seems to me completely incomprehensible; now they start something, now they give it up.' He was closer to the mark when he noted that 'Bolshevism is a contagion for any soldier and any tired army', and speculated that Bolshevik propaganda and 'bribery' were behind the failure of Allied intervention.  

Got'e's hatred of the Bolsheviks never slackened; nor did his hope of their defeat, though he was constantly disappointed, especially after the failure of the autumn 1919 offensives against Moscow and Petrograd. Shortly thereafter, he recorded rumours of Polish military designs on the Ukraine and the territory within the borders of the Polish state of 1772. 'It

11 Got'e, pp. 254-5; on French intervention, see Carley, Revolution and Intervention, passim; and also Philippe Masson, La marine française et la mer Noire, 1815-1919 (Paris, 1982).
serves the Russian fools right; a people that has ruined in three years what it took five hundred to create deserves its fate.’ After the Polish offensive began towards the end of April 1920, Got’e observed with considerable prescience: ‘The everlasting feud of the Russians and the Poles in which neither side can understand the other, is beginning again. As the Russians couldn’t understand that the Poles must be allowed to go their own way, so now the Poles can’t understand that by seizing the West Russian territories they are opening an era of new wars between Poland and Russia in the future’ (pp. 354-6).

But the oppressive fear of the spread of Bolshevism made Got’e unresponsive to the nationalist Bolshevik call to arms against the invading Poles. ‘Russia has become definitively Bolshevik’, he noted. Those who wished to continue the struggle against Bolshevism would therefore have to do so ‘with the help of borderlands, which are marching on Russia and will tear off her all they can’. Got’e unwittingly though perceptively described what had become French policy after the evacuation of Odessa and the Crimea.

From Got’e’s perspective, it was impossible to defend Russia against the Poles because to do so would be ‘for the good and the entrenchment of Bolshevism, which, behind the screen of national feeling ... will continue to undermine the world and will attempt by force of arms to introduce communism and anarchy as widely as possible’. Just before the decisive battle for Warsaw in mid-August 1920, Got’e was apprehensive: ‘Europe is on the eve of an invasion by [the Mongol khan] Batu or the Iluns in the form of Russian “liberators” ... something must happen’ (pp. 357, 376). Something did happen: the Poles counterattacked and threw back the Red Army. Got’e greeted this news with relief and satisfaction. The ‘comrades’ were being beaten ‘as they have never been beaten before’, but until they were overthrown, there could be no peace with the Poles. Of course, this was also the view of the French government, which at the end of August sought to organize a joint offensive of Poles, Romanians, and the remnants of the Volunteer Army in the Crimea against the Bolsheviks. 12 It all came to naught, however: a Russo-Polish armistice was signed in October 1920, and Got’e was filled with hopelessness. When the debris of the Volunteer Army was driven out of the Crimea in November, Got’e recorded that the Bolsheviks were ‘lucky because their opponents are always divided among themselves and can never agree’ (p. 389).

The end of the civil war and the consolidation of Bolshevik power left Got’e bitter and morose. Returning to an old theme, he noted, ‘a people that has ruined itself has no right to demand anyone’s help and sympathy.’ Anyway, the Russians were not a people, ‘but gorillas, who are only capable

of committing excesses and scratching their asses. Let them perish, let them bear the yoke of the Bolsheviks and of the foreigners' (p. 398). According to Emmons, Got'e must finally have reconciled himself to Soviet Russia, but there is no evidence of it in his final entries for 1922. He took a perverse pleasure in Soviet foreign policy set-backs. The Russian nationalist of 1917 had thus become an anti-nationalist or rather an anti-Bolshevik internationalist in 1922. Ironically, Got'e moved in an opposite direction from the Bolsheviks who gradually gave up their revolutionary internationalism to protect Soviet national interests. With such views Got'e was lucky not to run afoul of the Cheka.

Babine’s diary also ends in 1922 and although he comments little on Soviet foreign policy and almost not at all on the intervention, he does make some interesting observations about the famine that struck the Volga river basin in 1921. Saratov, of course, was very much affected by the famine and Babine actually worked for the American Relief Administration in the area. Unfortunately, Raleigh gives little background on the famine except to indicate, rather simplistically, that it was the result of Bolshevik policy. There is nothing about the severe drought that affected the area, the Allied blockade and military aid for the counter-revolution, or the Bolsheviks’ need to feed the cities that were the base of their popular support. Indeed, Raleigh implicitly shares the view of Luckett who sees the civil war as a struggle between two conflicting elites. ‘The revolution made on behalf of the workers’, observes Raleigh, ‘had caused civil war and had impoverished the entire country’ (p. 158). But was not the revolution also made by the workers? Was not the impoverishment of the country also intensified by the foreign intervention and blockade? Got’e, unlike Babine, comments on the Allied blockade, wondering in November 1919 if Russia would ‘be left to rot endlessly’, starving, ruined, and cut off from the outside world. It was not the last time that the western powers would blockade a revolutionary state, seek to destroy its economy, and then blame the revolutionary government for its country’s economic woes and calamities.

In any event, having contributed to Soviet Russia’s economic difficulties, it seems in hindsight fitting that the United States among others should have provided famine relief. Raleigh mistakenly denigrates Soviet suspicions, shared incidentally by Got’e, that food and other economic aid were political weapons; the Allied negotiations leading up to the Genoa conference of 1922 provide ample evidence to justify Soviet mistrust. However, it is a little astonishing to learn from Babine’s diary that some American and British relief workers in the Saratov area drank heavily,

dined sumptuously, and wenched shamelessly while Russians starved to death.

In the autumn of 1922 Babine left Soviet Russia to live in the United States. He too was lucky not to have fallen victim of the Cheka. Got’e often thought of leaving Russia, but never did. Although imprisoned at the end of the 1920s, he continued his distinguished academic career after his release in 1934. Ironically, he escaped the fate of some of the first generation of Soviet Marxist historians, who were executed during the Stalinist purges.

Whatever one may think of Got’e’s and Babine’s political ideas, it is possible to sympathize with them as they sought to cope with the destruction of their well-ordered lives, in the same way one can sympathize with Pasternak’s Zhivago or Sholokov’s Melekhovs. But the sympathy cannot go very far. Babine and Got’e were self-centred, bigoted, conservative men. They had little contact with and no liking for workers and peasants except as servants to their class. When the revolution came, they recoiled at having to rub shoulders with the ‘comrades’. They yearned for the ancien régime. They criticized others of their class for not resisting the revolution, but as Raleigh points out, Babine did not resist either. Nor did Got’e, who hoped instead for German or Allied intervention to rid Russia of the Bolsheviks. Their passivity illustrates the point made by Luckett and Kenez about the moral failures of the anti-Bolshevik movement.

Finally, the Babine and Got’e diaries, as well as the books by Kettle and Luckett, are not about the hopes and enthusiasm of the revolution, but rather about its nether side: the force and fury of the counter-revolutionary resistance. In spite of Raleigh’s shallow editorial comments and Kettle’s shortcomings, these books reviewed here are useful additions to the body of literature on the foreign intervention and the civil war. One should not forget that these events influenced and perhaps continue to influence the attitudes and policies of both Soviet and western governments.