Cold War, decolonization, and terrorism in the 1970s; fifth, the post-1989 resumption of ethnic violence in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, new forms of terrorism, and, more generally, the rejection of a Western-dominated international order.

The first chapter, authored by five of the volumes contributors, largely expands upon the claims and frameworks introduced in the introduction. Engaging directly with recent scholarship on the twentieth century by Hobsbawm, Mark Mazower, Ian Kershaw, and Volker R. Berghahn, this ambitious chapter argues against the almost universal view of 1914 as the catastrophic event of the twentieth century. Instead, the chapter provides a coherent analysis of how the European-designed international system fell into crisis in both the domestic and imperial spheres, leading to and shaping the violence of the twentieth century. The most noteworthy discussion addresses the unfolding of this crisis in the borderlands of the Ottoman Empire, where from the 1870s onward, the establishment and expansion of new states led to widespread violence and ethnic cleansing. Thus, the familiar account of the Great War’s origin in the Balkans omits “an appreciation of the way in which so much of the subsequent violence in Europe was prefigured and initially reached its full expression in Southeast Europe.” In these “imperial shatterzones,” nationalists and imperialists began creating “fledgling monocultural states” by killing, deporting, and forcibly assimilating “enemy” civilians. The Great War, then, “expanded the scope” of this “pattern of state oppression, terrorism, revolt, ethnic conflict, international intervention, forced resettlement of populations and ethnic cleansing and genocide” (p. 39).

In his chapter, “War,” the late James McMillan, to whom the volume is dedicated, begins by exploring the colonial and European antecedents of World War I. McMillan then argues that the ferocity of European wars before 1945 was owed to the “war culture” that became pervasive in European society during World War I. Widespread cultural practices depicted the war as a tool for making a new world and the “demonized” enemy as standing in the way. In extreme forms, this trope reappeared in the Spanish Civil War and, ultimately, World War II. Meanwhile, in the period after 1945, the view of Europe as largely peaceful was an “optical” illusion. McMillan concludes, however, that Europeans had mostly turned their backs on “war culture,” with notable exceptions. Finally, against the prevailing view, McMillan stresses the role of religion in war and peace, revealing how clergymen and religious tropes played critical roles in both mobilizing bloody-minded war culture and, after 1945, promoting conciliatory, pacifist stances.

If McMillan’s essay largely omits the gory details of the two world wars, Bloxham’s and A. Dirk Moses’s chapter, “Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing,” offers an extended catalogue of population exchanges, genocides, massacres, mass rapes, and other horrors. The chapter sets out to identify the “extensive causal or contextual interconnections between different cases” within the relatively finite “spatio-temporal setting” of twentieth-century Europe (p. 87). Genocides, the authors argue, require more than just exclusionary ideologies. Interstate conflict, regional destabilization, and mass population movements were decisive factors. Indeed, with the major exception of the Holocaust, campaigns of genocide mostly depended on where victimized populations lived, and not just their ethnic or racial identity. Whether states viewed them as dangerous fifth columns or pretexts for territorial expansion, ethnic minorities located in borderlands often fell victim to “internationally sanctioned, controlled ethnic exchanges” or unilateral ethnic cleansing seeking to create “demographic faits accomplis” (p. 133).

The unifying theme of Martin Conway and Garthwaite’s contribution, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution,” is the extent to which political violence occurs not in a distinct political sphere, or solely as an outgrowth of metaphors of “cleansing” society. Instead five factors explain variations in political violence during revolutionary moments: socio-economic conflict, ethnic conflict, power vacuums, the role of the state, and the revolutionary movements themselves. The chapter’s analysis demonstrates these points, showing how revolutions became less violent in the changing context of the late-twentieth century. The revolutions of 1989, for example, occurred in the mid-century killing zone of East-Central Europe, yet were largely free of violence.

In “Terrorism and the State,” Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Klaus Weinhauser argue that terrorism arose mainly as a reaction to growing state power and alongside increasingly complex modern societies that included social movements (particularly labor). Moreover, terrorism depended on mass politics and mass media. The authors also note that despite sharing some common features, new terrorist organizations had little connection to previous ones. Instead, terrorism appeared in response to events, most often the actions of the state, as marginalized or victimized social groups responded violently to police brutality, an expansion of repression, or military occupation policies. Finally, terrorism was most commonly used by movements that were either not fully formed or in decline.

Taken separately, the approaches adopted in each chapter may not all appear strikingly new to specialists, yet the volume is highly innovative and deserves to be widely read. It presents one of the most coherent analyses of political violence in twentieth-century Europe, elaborating arguments and making connections across cases more effectively than any existing scholarship.

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Zara Steiner’s long book is a diplomatic history of how World War II began. It is the second of a two-volume
history of the European interwar years. The author, well-known simply as Zara and nearly iconic in stature, has produced an impressive history of a still controversial subject. It is a prodigious work, reflecting great industry and mastery of Western scholarship on the 1930s.

The book’s title sounds like a heading from J. R. R. Tolkien, but Steiner’s work is not fiction, although it is almost as complex as Tolkien’s plot lines. “This is a time,” writes the author, “with few heroes, two evil Titans, and an assortment of villains and knives” (p. 1). Perhaps she is being a little unkind, for there were more than a few “heroes” who struggled to raise the alarm against the tenebrous peril of Nazi Germany. They were found everywhere in Europe from London to Moscow and were of every political conviction. Unfortunately, their Cassandra-like warnings went unheeded by Steiner’s “villains and knives,” driven by hubris and/or fear. Some of them thought they were smarter than they were, or at least smart enough to conciliate Adolf Hitler and to avoid war, ruin, and socialist revolution.

Steiner does not take provocative positions in the debates over the “realism” or cravenness of appeasement, the western elite’s admiration for fascism, or the intent of Soviet “collective security.” She hews to a middle course, navigating through all the parlous reefs of strong opinion on the war’s origins, and necessarily so since her work is based largely on the secondary literature. During the book’s long gestation, Steiner seems to have moved from a relatively consensual position attempting, for example, to explain British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s foreign policy, to a more critical line as she encountered newer “counter-revisionist” studies.

In Tolkien’s tales, the protagonists know who the enemy is. But Steiner’s characters are not so clear-eyed. “Who is enemy no. 1, the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany?” was the habitual question of the 1930s. Many powerful politicians got the answer wrong. They did not want to face facts about Hitler, who had published his blueprint for European conquest in Mein Kampf (1925–1927). German diplomats dismissed the book as irrelevant, and his sympathizers outside Germany preferred to ignore Hitler’s published ideas. I can deal with this man, Chamberlain thought. As Steiner put it, the British prime minister misjudged Hitler even after war broke out in September 1939. Édouard Daladier, the center-right French premier (April 1938 to March 1940), took a better measure of Nazi Germany but lacked the confidence, or the guns and gold, to act on it. Daladier hoped for help from the United States, but who knew what President Franklin D. Roosevelt was going to do?

Then there was the Soviet Union. In 1933, it laid out a new policy of “collective security” to counter the Nazi danger. “Collective security” meant in fact an anti-Nazi coalition based on the anti-German alliance of World War I. Even fascist Italy would have its place. The Soviet spokesman for collective security was the Russian Talleyrand, Maksim Litvinov, but behind him was the dictator Joseph Stalin. He owned all Soviet policy. Could Stalin be trusted? Western politicians did not think so, and they rejected Soviet proposals. They preferred to seek accommodation with Hitler to avoid war and its ugly twin, socialist revolution. Steiner does not say much about the twin, but it was there alarming and confusing Western statesmen. The high point, or the low, of Anglo-French policy was the Munich dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in September 1938. If France and Britain would not work with the USSR, they had a hard time working together. The British were contemptuous of the French, who needed Albion’s guidance, while the latter, dependent and resentful, thought the British were shirking and ready to let France shed the blood in a new war against Germany. Basically, it was each for himself: Britain failed to recognize its vital interests in Flanders; and France, in Eastern Europe. Hitler could not have asked for more.

Anglo-French policy changed somewhat in March 1939 when rump Czechoslovakia was absorbed by Germany. Afterward, most people in France and Britain thought war was unavoidable. The hitherto spurned USSR suddenly became more attractive as an ally, or a scarecrow to deter Hitler. Imagine bloody Stalin’s cynicism after five years of failed efforts to organize an anti-Nazi front. As Steiner notes, he gave Litvinov one last chance to put it together. The British scoffed at him though the French were more interested, but Stalin sacked Litvinov in early May 1939. Like the football proprietor firing a coach who cannot win, it was time to try another strategy.

Steiner gives a good account of the dénouement when Anglo-French negotiations with the USSR failed, and Stalin, stealing a march on the West, concluded the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact in August 1939. In Steiner’s final chapters the now familiar “villains and knives” play their last scenes. It is a sad, tragic history. After reading this long book, one rests as one might after a marathon, satisfied, hands on hips to catch one’s breath, reflecting on the mistakes and miscalculations of statesmen who led Europe into catastrophe.

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Contemporary Catholic teaching regarding Judaism has been shaped profoundly by chapter four of Nostra Aetate, one of the documents produced at the Second Vatican Council. The chapter affirms that the Jews, whom God holds “most dear,” still stand in a covenantal relationship with God, that Jesus Christ and his family and earliest followers were Jews, and that Christianity is rooted in Judaism. It acknowledges the integrity of Judaism, thus obviating the need for Jews to convert to Christianity. It rejects the charge that Jews are