This paper proposes a model of Parliamentary institutions in which a society makes three decisions behind the veil of ignorance: whether a Parliament should comprise one or two chambers, what the relative bargaining power of each chamber should be if the Parliament is bicameral, and how many legislators should sit in each chamber. We document empirical regularities across countries that are consistent with the predictions of our model. (JEL D71, D72)

I. INTRODUCTION

Parliamentary institutions vary widely across countries. For instance, the Indian Lower Chamber—Lok Sabha—has 543 to 545 seats, and the Indian Upper Chamber—Rajya Sabha—has 250. The U.S. Congress has 535 seats: 435 in the House of Representatives and 100 in the Senate. The Luxembourg Parliament has 60 legislators, in a single chamber.1 As of 2012, there were 58 bicameral and 110 unicameral systems recorded in the Database of Political Institutions (DPI; Beck et al. 2001 [updated in 2012]).

The main questions that arise when designing Parliamentary institutions are fundamentally quantitative: should there be one or two chambers, what should be their respective bargaining power, what should be the size of Parliament, and so on. James Madison, in the “Federalist No. 10,” postulates a concave and increasing relationship between the population and the number of representatives.2 In “Federalist No. 62,” he argues in favor of an Upper Chamber as a safeguard against the errors of a large Lower Chamber.3

However, little is known on the institutional regularities of Parliaments across countries. Indeed, only two stylized facts have been documented: a linear relationship between the log of the size of the population and the log of the size of Parliament (Stigler 1976) and an increasing relationship between the population size and the probability to have a bicameral Parliament (Massicotte 2001).

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to propose a model of Parliament design and to document empirical institutional regularities across countries, following the lead of the predictions of the model. One of our contributions is that our simple model generates predictions concerning variables that have an unambiguous equivalent in the data we observe.

2. “In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases [will be] proportionally greater in the small republic” (Madison 1788a).

3. “The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions” (Madison 1788d).

ABBREVIATIONS

DPI: Database of Political Institutions
i.i.d.: Identically and Independently Distributed

1. Throughout the paper, we use the term “legislator” to refer to a member of Parliament. If a Parliament is unicameral, we refer to its chamber as the House or the Lower Chamber, indifferently. If there is a second chamber, we refer to it as the Senate or Upper Chamber, indifferently.
There are two stages in the model: a Constitutional stage and a Legislative stage. At the Constitutional stage, society, which is made up of a discrete population of individuals, designs a Constitution by writing three decisions into the social contract: whether a Parliament should comprise one or two chambers, what the relative bargaining power of each chamber should be if the Parliament is bicameral, and how many legislators should sit in each chamber. These decisions are made behind a veil of ignorance, that is, before the members of society know their own preferences. As everyone is identical behind the veil of ignorance, they will unanimously agree that the goal should be to maximize the expected utility of the representative agent. They know that each individual’s utility is the opposite of the quadratic difference between the policy adopted by the Parliament and the individual’s bliss point, which are both real numbers, minus the costs associated with the functioning of Parliament.

We assume that the population is partitioned into parties and that two types of issues may arise: partisan and nonpartisan. For nonpartisan issues, individuals’ bliss points are identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.), whereas for partisan issues, all members of a party share the same bliss point, the party’s bliss point. Parties’ bliss points are i.i.d. across parties. Individuals do not know their partisan affiliations at the Constitutional stage. Nor do they know which type of issue may arise, the distribution of shares of parties’ members in the population, or the realized distribution of bliss points in the population or among legislators.

At the Legislative stage, the Parliament decides on a policy. To formalize society’s information about Parliament’s decision process, we assume that only one issue arises, and that the policy adopted for that issue is the weighted average of the policies that maximize the aggregate utility of each chamber, subject to some error.\(^4\)

We consider two allocation systems of Parliamentary seats: a proportional representation and a nonproportional representation system. In the proportional representation system, the distribution of seat shares across parties is equal to the distribution of shares of partisans in the population. In the nonproportional system, these distributions may differ. In an extension (Appendix C), we show that the distribution of legislators in the proportional representation system is obtained from a two-stage game. In the first stage, parties may form coalitions to maximize the share of seats they obtain in a proportional single-district election. In the second stage, each individual casts one vote, either for a party or for a coalition of parties, to maximize his expected utility, which is a function of the policy adopted, under perfect information about legislators’ partisan affiliations, but imperfect information about the exact value of their bliss points.\(^5,6\)

The problem at the Constitutional stage involves two trade-offs. On one hand, there is a trade-off between the unit cost of a member of Parliament and the marginal benefit of having a larger Parliament to lower the risk that the policy will be decided by legislators whose preferences are far from those of the population at large. One could see this trade-off in terms of external costs and internal or decision-making costs. (External costs are the costs that individuals have to bear as a result of others’ decisions whenever an action is chosen collectively. Internal costs stem from an individual’s participation in an organized activity, such as legislative bargaining, see Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Chapter 15.) The former decrease in expectation as the size of Parliament increases; indeed, the larger the Parliament the more precisely it will estimate the average bliss point of the population. The latter costs, by contrast, will increase as Parliament becomes larger; indeed, the more numerous the assembly, the costlier it will be to ensure its proper functioning. In our model, we assume that the marginal internal cost of parliamentarians is constant. On the other hand, there is a trade-off between the unit cost of a chamber and the benefit of instituting a Senate to mitigate the negative impact of the error term in the adopted policy. That error term formalizes in the simplest way possible the common point in defenses of bicameralism, such as Madison’s, which is that members of the Lower Chamber might not

\(^4\) In a unicameral system, the policy adopted is the policy proposed by the unique chamber.

\(^5\) Any game using a nonproportional voting system requires many more assumptions than the game in which voting is at-large and proportional. For the latter, we would need to specify the number of districts, the size of each district (which may not be uniform in practice), the distribution of partisans in each district, the possibility for parties to form coalitions within and across districts, and so on. We do not propose such a model; instead, we make an assumption on the system of allocation of seats that is consistent with an empirical analysis of nonproportional voting systems.

\(^6\) The conclusions of the model would be the same if we considered an electorate whose votes are determined by partisan loyalty, which is the main determinant of voting behavior according to Achen and Bartels (2016), rather than policy preferences.
adopt the best policy according to some measure of welfare.

The model provides several predictions. First, the log of the size of Parliament increases linearly with the log of the size of the population, which is consistent with one of the two stylized facts mentioned above.

Second, the number of legislators ought not to depend on the unicameral or bicameral structure of the legislature.

Third, the relative bargaining power of a chamber in a bicameral system should optimally be equal to the share of legislators belonging to this chamber.

Fourth, countries with a larger population are more likely to have a bicameral legislature, the other stylized fact mentioned above. Fifth, the model predicts no impact of the factors that affect the size of Parliament, except the size of the population, on whether a country has a unicameral or bicameral Parliament.

We find that the number of legislators depends on whether the system is proportional or not. Our sixth prediction is that in a proportional voting system, the makeup of the partisan structure of a country does not affect the number of legislators. Our seventh prediction is that, as the partisan structure becomes more dispersed, as measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, the number of legislators ought to rise. To derive testable predictions, we compute the optimal number of seats for a specific nonproportional system in which a fixed number of seats are granted to the party with the biggest share of partisans in the population, and the remaining seats are randomly distributed across all parties, including the largest party, according to their share of partisans in the population.

Empirically, we find that all these predictions are consistent with the results of a series of estimations that we conduct on a sample of 75 nonautocratic countries for which we have detailed political information over the period 1975 to 2012. For the average bargaining power of Upper Houses across bicameral countries, we use the estimation provided in Bradbury and Crain (2001).

Our model also provides specific predictions, which are borne out by the data, concerning the coefficient of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index of partisan fractionalization as well as that of other terms.

Finally, we provide two tests of the assumption we use to compute the size of Parliament in nonproportional representation systems. First, we estimate that, on average across observations at the country/party/election year level, the party ranked first by decreasing share of votes obtains around 10% of seats in the Lower Chamber. Second, we find that the rest of the seats are allocated across all parties, including the party ranked first, so that the share of seats and the share of votes of a party are the same, regardless of the party’s rank.

The rest of the paper is set up as follows: Section II reviews related literature; Section III presents the model, which is used to derive the predictions exhibited in Section IV; Section V presents the empirical analysis; Section VI concludes. Descriptive statistics are in Appendix A. Appendix B presents tests of the assumptions used in nonproportional representation systems. Appendix C presents a two-stage voting game that substantiates the reduced-form analysis of proportional systems.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Our contribution relates to the literature on endogenous political institutions.7 The distinction between a Constitutional stage, in which decision procedures are created, and a subsequent legislative stage, in which a policy is chosen, was studied in Romer and Rosenthal (1983). While Romer and Rosenthal (1983) find a certain unanimity rule to be optimal in their setting, Aghion and Bolton (2003) find that it is optimal to require an interior majority threshold for a change in the status quo policy.8

The seminal theory concerning the size of legislatures is the cube root formula proposed by Taagepera (1972), which holds that the number of legislators should equal the cube root of the population of a country. This formula is designed to prevent excessive disproportionality in representation—see Lijphart (2012). Theoretically, it results from the minimization of the number of communication channels for assembly members, who need to communicate with their

7. Stigler (1992) claimed a role for economists in the study of legal institutions, writing: “Understanding the source, structure, and evolution of a legal system is the kind of project that requires skills that are possessed but not monopolized by economists, for it is in good part an empirical project addressed to rational social policy.”

8. The crucial difference is that Aghion and Bolton (2003) assume that there is a deadweight loss associated with implementing monetary transfers designed to compensate the losers of the reform being proposed.
constituents while also communicating with their fellow assembly members. Empirically, this formula underpredicts the sizes of Parliaments.

Auriol and Gary-Bobo (2012) adopt a mechanism-design approach to the design of Parliamentary institutions. In their model, the principal (the “Founding Fathers”) does not know the distribution of preferences over a one-dimensional policy choice to be made, and knows that no agent in society will know them. Rather, the “Founding Fathers” have a diffuse prior over the set of possible distributions of preferences. Furthermore, there is an executive branch, made up of a randomly chosen single agent who is the residual claimant of all decision rights not specifically delegated to the legislative branch. The legislative branch, by contrast, is made up of \( n \) randomly chosen agents, whose role consists of revealing their preferences truthfully. Truthful revelation is effected by a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism applied to the agents making up the legislative branch. In our model, by contrast, there is no executive branch, and the legislators’ salaries are exogenously given. This simpler model allows us to derive additional predictions concerning the structure of Parliaments, such as their bicameral or unicameral nature, the impact of different voting systems, and the effect of preferences that are homogeneous within given groups.

We do not explicitly model the decision process in Parliament, which is the focus of the legislative bargaining literature, starting with Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Baron and Diermeier (2001), and Diermeier and Merlo (2000).

As the predictions of these bargaining models often depend on the fine details of the bargaining protocol, which varies widely across countries, we instead use a spatial model of policy preferences and assume that each chamber adopts as its policy the average bliss point of its members. This policy maximizes the sum of legislators’ utilities, and thus corresponds to the behavior they would optimally adopt in a setting in which utilities are transferrable.\(^9\) In contrast to, for instance, the analysis in Tsebelis and Money (1997), our legislators do not anticipate the impact of their decisions on the bargaining process with the other chamber in a bicameral system.

The literature on bicameralism has devoted some attention to the impact of a second chamber on the process of legislative bargaining and subsequent policy choices. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ting (2003) analyze a situation where the House has one member per district while the Senate has one member per state. As in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), the object of legislative bargaining is to divide a fixed budget of resources. House districts are equal in population size, while states may encompass several House districts. Legislators in both chambers are responsive to their respective median voter. Both chambers have to agree to a proposed division of the resources, and both vote by majority rule, but only representatives can propose a bill. They show that smaller states, which are over-represented in the Senate, do not get a higher per capita share of spending. The reason is that a minimum winning coalition in the House carries a majority in the Senate as well. However, small state bias reappears if there are supermajority rules in the Senate, Senators have proposal power, or goods are lumpy (i.e., they cannot be targeted toward a single district). Kalandrakis (2004) analyzes a variant of this model where resources can only be targeted at the state level, and Senators can be recognized as proposers as well. He finds that supermajorities may occur in equilibrium, but they only ever do in one chamber at a time. Parameswaran (2018) adopts this model by letting the goods be targeted at the House-district level. He finds that small states may actually fare worse with a Senate in which they are over-represented than in a unicameral system without malapportionment. The reason is that, if a Senator from a big state is recognized as the proposer, he can at no cost buy off all the House members from his state. Thus, he needs to include fewer small state legislators in his winning coalition, which in turn makes it less likely that representatives from a small state will be included in the winning coalition. Knight (2008) investigates empirically the role of representation for the division of funds in the United States. He finds that small states receive a larger share of appropriations originating in the Senate than of those originating in the House. He distinguishes between the proposer-power channel resulting from a state’s representation on the relevant committees and the vote-cost channel resulting from the proposer’s need to build a winning coalition. Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005) show that when votes are weighted in a unicameral setting, a legislator’s ex ante expected share of the resources equals his voting weight. Thus, the biases introduced by a malapportioned second chamber could in principle be replicated by

\(^9\) See also our discussion in Section III.B.
a unicameral system with weighted voting. Vespa (2016) runs a laboratory experiment testing the impact of weighted voting in a unicameral setting as compared to bicameralism with a malapportioned second chamber, confirming the theoretical predictions that there will be a small state bias with weighted voting. In a bicameral system, this bias appears if and only if Senators have proposal power, as predicted by Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ting (2003).10

Facchini and Testa (2005) study the interaction of legislators with lobbying groups in a bicameral setting. Rogers (1998) also formalizes an informational justification for bicameralism. He assumes that larger chambers have lower costs for information acquisition, giving them a larger first-mover advantage.

Our paper complements these papers. Instead of looking in detail at a model that tries to formalize the U.S. Congressional system in a Collective Bargaining framework, we use a reduced form model to formalize as simply as possible the most universal motivation in favor of a Senate, which is to reduce the probability of legislative errors. We do not attempt to explain where such error comes from. Instead, we formalize in greater detail what the Parliament designers’ objectives may be. For the same reasons, our empirical analysis aims less at explaining the policies adopted by a specific Parliament, such as the U.S. Congress, than at explaining what may have motivated the specific design features (number of seats and number of Chambers) of Parliaments across countries in the first place.

We also do not consider issues pertaining to the acquisition or transmission of information within the legislature, all legislators being perfectly informed of their respective bliss points. By contrast, an early investigation of legislators’ incentives to acquire information is provided by Gersbach (1992). Austen-Smith and Riker (1987) analyze legislators’ incentives to reveal or conceal private information they may have.

Our paper is also related to the literature on electoral systems. The argument most often cited in favor of proportional systems is that they lead to a more faithful representation of a population’s opinions in Parliament, whereas plurality systems are more likely to obviate the need for multiparty coalitions, thus leading to greater stability (Blais 1991; Grofman and Lijphart 1986). Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) show that countries with greater ethno-linguistic fractionalization are more likely to have plurality voting systems, which are interpreted as a means of achieving greater insulation of the political leadership. While also minimizing the role of strategic behavior in the establishment of political parties, Lijphart (1990) finds that the voting system has little impact on the number of parties. Finally, a few studies link voting systems to voter turnout (Herrera, Morelli, and Nunnari 2016; Herrera, Morelli, and Palfrey 2014). Our paper contributes to this literature by relating the structure of Parliament to the voting system and to partisan fractionalization.

III. MODEL

A. Setup

We consider a population of $M$ individuals. At the Constitutional stage, they want to maximize the representative agent’s expected utility through their choice of the setup of Parliament. They choose whether Parliament will be unicameral or bicameral, and set the number of members of the House $n_H$. If they choose a bicameral Parliament, they also set the number of members of the Senate $n_S$, and the bargaining power of the House and the Senate, denoted $\alpha$ and $1-\alpha$, respectively.

Preferences. An individual $i$’s utility is:

$$u_i(x) = -\left( x - x_i \right)^2 - \left( NC + nc \right) / M$$

where $x \in \mathbb{R}$ is the policy to be adopted by the Parliament, $x_i \in \mathbb{R}$ is $i$’s bliss point, $N \in \{1, 2\}$ is the number of chambers, $C$ the unit cost of a chamber, $n$ the number of members of Parliament, and $c$ the unit cost of a member of Parliament.11

The first term represents the payoff obtained from the policy adopted, and the second term represents the per capita contribution to the funding of Parliament.12

Distribution of Bliss Points. The population is partitioned into partisan groups or parties, and

10. See also Buchanan and Tullock (1962, Chapter 16), Riker (1992), Diermeier and Myerson (1994), Diermeier and Myerson (1999), Rogers (1998), Bradbury and Crain (2001), Tsebelis and Money (1997), and the references in these papers.

11. The unit cost of a chamber may comprise its maintenance cost and the potential rent of the building where its members meet. The unit cost of a member of Parliament may comprise his salary.

12. While we make the assumption of quadratic utility for the purpose of tractability, one could interpret the quadratic utility function as a second-order Taylor approximation of a more general utility function. Indeed let $u_i(x)$ be agent $i$’s smooth utility function depending on the policy
two types of political issues may arise: partisan and nonpartisan. For partisan issues, all members of a partisan group share the same bliss point; bliss points are drawn independently across parties. For nonpartisan issues, bliss points are drawn independently across individuals.

We assume that the distribution from which bliss points are drawn, either parties’ bliss points for partisan issues or individual bliss points for nonpartisan issues, is continuous and has a variance $\sigma^2 \in (0, \infty)$.

**Policy Admitted at the Legislative Stage.** Legislators have the same type of preferences as the rest of the population. Once in Parliament, legislators adopt a policy for the unique issue that has arisen. With probability $q \in [0, 1]$, the issue that arises is partisan.

If Parliament members are numbered 1 through $n_H + n_S$, with members of the House numbered first and members of the Senate numbered second, we assume that the policy adopted for this issue is:

$$x^* = \alpha \left( \frac{1}{n_H} \sum_{k=1}^{n_H} x_k + \tilde{Z}_H \right)$$

$$+ (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{1}{n_S} \sum_{k=n_H+1}^{n_H+n_S} x_k + \tilde{Z}_S \right)$$

where $x_k$ is legislator $k$’s bliss point for the issue discussed, $\alpha$ represents the bargaining power of the House, and $\tilde{Z}_X$ is an error term for chamber $X$.

The policy adopted is the weighted average of the policies that maximize the sum of the utilities of the members of each chamber, subject to some error, where the weight is the bargaining power conferred to each chamber at the Constitutional stage.

We assume that the error term $\tilde{Z}_X$ is independently drawn from a distribution of mean zero and square mean $\nu_X > 0$. The error term captures any difference between the policy adopted by a chamber and the cooperatively optimal policy for its members. It may be interpreted as the result of imperfections in the deliberation process, which may manifest themselves in various ways: it could be the probability that a subgroup of members imposes its favorite policy, or that negotiations among members fail, and so on.

**Information.** At the time of the design of Parliament, it is not known which issue will arise, or what the actual distribution of bliss points across individuals or across legislators will be. It is known, however, that there will be $G$ parties. Society also has a prior belief at the Constitutional stage regarding the shares of these groups in the overall population, $\gamma = (\gamma_g)_{g=1}^G \in (0, 1)^G$ (with $\sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g = 1$). They know too how the legislators’ preferences map into the adopted policy (Equation (1)).

**Representation in Parliament.** We consider two systems of representation: a system of proportional representation in which the partisan distribution of shares of seats in Parliament is equal to the distribution of shares of partisans in the population, and a system of nonproportional representation. Legislators’ bliss points for nonpartisan issues are i.i.d.

### B. Discussion of Assumptions

**Society Sets Up a Parliament.** Why would society set up a Parliament in the first place? This is a question broached by Buchanan and Tullock (1962, Chapter 15). On one hand, delegating decision-making powers to a Parliament increases the external costs, as compared to direct democracy, because there will always be some chance that Parliamentary representation might lead to a biased sample of population preferences. Yet, as Buchanan and Tullock (1962, paragraph 3.15.6) argue, the risk of bias has to be traded off against the decrease in decision-making costs. Representative (as opposed to direct) democracy facilitates collective action. Equations (2) and (3) can be interpreted as the formalization of this
very trade-off\textsuperscript{13}; the benefit part in the equations corresponds to a decrease in external costs, while the cost part could be interpreted as an increase in decision-making costs, as the size of Parliament increases. Madison also discusses the optimal size of the House of Representatives, inter alia, in the “Federalist No. 55” and “Federalist No. 58,”\textsuperscript{14} see the discussion of the size principle in Ostrom (2008, Chapter 5). Ostrom (2008) points out that the larger a legislative assembly becomes, the less time individual representatives will have to make their arguments, as only one representative can speak at a time. Thus, large assemblies will tend to be dominated by an oligarchic leadership, as is arguably the case in the House of Commons in the United Kingdom. At the same time, a certain minimum number of representatives is needed “to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes” (Madison 1788b).

While it is necessary for society to know the variance in the distribution of bliss points at the Constitutional stage already, none of our calculations depend on society’s already knowing the mean or any other characteristics of this distribution. If the dispersion of this mean is large enough, it will not be practical for society to set a policy at the Constitutional stage already.

\textit{Wages $c$ Are Exogenous.} We could endogenize wages by assuming that higher wages will lead to better legislators being selected, that is, $v_X$ is decreasing in $c$. We refrain from doing so here because we do not observe $v_X$ in the data and thus have no way of ascertaining the functional form of the dependency of $v_X$ on $c$.

\textit{The Population Considered at the Constitutional Stage May Differ from the Actual Population.} Such a case may arise for two reasons: a fixed size of Parliament may still apply many years after it was set, when the size of the population has changed, or the preferences of parts of the population, for example, a disenfranchised population, may not be included in the Constitution Designers’ objective functions.

We need not interpret $M$ as the actual population size; in fact, our predictions would continue to hold if $M$ were a fraction or a multiple of the actual population size.

\textit{The Electoral System Is Exogenously Given.} In our model, society should always prefer a proportional voting system over a nonproportional system. This is because we do not integrate any offsetting benefits of nonproportional systems, which may for instance lead to greater stability of Parliamentary majorities and may favor stronger ties between legislators and their constituents, thus leading to greater accountability. In particular, we assume that there is no relationship between the voting system and the cost of Parliament or with the error terms that arise in the adopted policy of either chamber. This assumption implies that the voting system is not significantly correlated with the probability to have a second chamber; we examine this implication in Section V.

In a system of proportional representation, a party’s share of seats corresponds to its share of the votes. Thus, we assume that voters vote for their respective parties. We show in Appendix C that this is the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome if voters only know their partisan affiliations at the time of the vote. In particular, it is assumed that they do not know the realizations of the various parties’ bliss points at the time of voting. This assumption captures the idea that voters will be uncertain about the details of the question that will arise before the Legislature.

Achen and Bartels (2016) argue that voters choose parties and candidates on the basis of social identities and partisan loyalties, even adjusting their policy views to match these loyalties. Such behavior would be perfectly in line with our assumptions.\textsuperscript{15} The observation that the link between voters’ partisan loyalties and their policy preferences was tenuous would correspond to a low $q$ in our model.

\textit{The Role of the Second Chamber.} While one rationale that is often used to justify the existence of second chambers is to give some (over-)representation to certain minorities, our model makes an implicit assumption that either chamber equally represents any citizen. Indeed, if the goal were to (over-)represent some minority, this could also be achieved by quotas or weighted voting in a unicameral system (see Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere 2005 for a Baron and Ferejohn 1989 bargaining type model). By the same token,

\textsuperscript{13} We are indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out this connection to us.

\textsuperscript{14} See Madison (1788b, 1788c).

\textsuperscript{15} Of course, Achen and Bartels (2016) focus their analysis on the United States, which does not use proportional representation.
if the role of a second chamber were merely to make it more difficult to pass legislation, the same could be achieved in a unicameral system, for example, by imposing supermajority rules. Indeed, Cutrone and McCarty (2006) conclude: “Regardless of the theoretical framework or the collective action problem to be solved, we find that both the positive and normative arguments in favor of bicameralism tend to be weak and underdeveloped. Most of the effects of bicameralism are due primarily to quite distinct institutional choices, such as malapportionment and super-majoritarianism, which correlate empirically with bicameralism. There seems to be no logical reason why the benefits of these institutions—like the protection of minority rights and the preservation of federalism—could not be obtained by a suitably engineered unicameral legislature or through vigorous judicial review.”

By contrast, we see the goal of bicameralism, which cannot easily be reproduced within a unicameral system, as providing for a second, independent deliberative process in the law-making procedure. Indeed, we view representative democracy as a sampling of population preferences, which are subsequently aggregated. Each Parliamentary chamber corresponds to such an aggregation process. As aggregation processes are subject to error, it can be useful to have a second, independent aggregation process. Consistent with this view, we abstract from any design differences in the two legislative chambers, as it is not clear why certain peculiarities of second chambers, for instance those designed to protect a minority or the federal structure of a country, could not be replicated in a unicameral setting. The analysis of the impact of a malapportioned second chamber, or malapportionment in general, which motivates much of the literature on bargaining in bicameral legislatures (see our discussion in Section II), is thus left outside the scope of this paper.

The Legislative Bargaining Process and the Determination of the Adopted Policy. We assume that, at the Constitutional stage, the Constitution designers anticipate that legislators within either Chamber act cooperatively when choosing the policy to be adopted (see Equation (1)). While this is no doubt a somewhat naïve view of the legislative process, there is some evidence that legislators will often trade their votes intertemporally across issues (so-called log-rolling, see, e.g., Stratmann 1992). If one takes for granted that the utility legislators derive from the enactment of particular policies is transferable in this way, legislators should always adopt the policy that maximizes the sum of their utilities, as we assume in Equation (1). Any failure to do so would amount to an error on their part, as it reduces the surplus to be distributed among them. In our opinion, this admittedly idealized view of the legislative bargaining process has the merit of not depending on the fine details of the Parliamentary procedures governing coalition formation within and across legislative chambers (e.g., the choice of proposer, the navette system between chambers, etc.), which vary widely across countries.

IV. RESULTS

We first analyze the case of proportional voting, before turning to nonproportional systems. We neglect integer problems throughout our analysis.

A. Proportional Representation

For Proportional Representation, we assume that the shares of a party’s members in the population and in Parliament are equal.

Unicameral Parliament. If a nonpartisan issue arises, which happens with probability \((1 - q) \in (0, 1)\), the policy choice is

\[
x^* = \frac{\sum_{d=1}^{n} x_d}{n} + Z_H,
\]

where \(n\) is the number of legislators, and \((x_d)_{d=1}^{n}\) are their bliss points. These are i.i.d. draws from a distribution with variance \(\sigma^2\).

If a partisan issue arises, the policy choice is:

\[
x^* = \sum_{g=1}^{G} y_g x_g + Z_H.
\]

At the Constitutional stage, society maximizes:

\[
(2) \quad \mathbb{E} \left[ u_i \right] = -\mathbb{E} \left[ (x^* - x_i)^2 \right] - C + n_H c M
\]

\[
= -\sigma^2 \left\{ q \left[ 1 - \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^{G} y_g^2 \right] \right] \right. \\
\left. + (1 - q) \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{n_H} \right] \right\} - v_H - C + n_H c M.
\]
Thus, when all parties are guaranteed proportional representation in Parliament regardless of its size, only the nonpartisan issues matter for the optimal size of Parliament. Indeed, the only role of Parliament in our model consists in the sampling of population preferences. In particular, the size of Parliament will be independent of the partisan fractionalization of society. The optimal number of members of Parliament is given by:

\[ n^* = n_H^* = \sigma \sqrt{(1 - q) \frac{M}{c}}. \]

**Bicameral Parliament.** With two chambers, the representative agent’s ex ante expected utility is given by:

\[
\mathbb{E} [u_i] = -\sigma^2 \left\{ q \left( 1 - \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_g^2 \right] \right) + (1 - q) \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha^2}{n_H} + \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{n_S} \right) \right\} - (\alpha^2 v_H + (1 - \alpha)^2 v_S) - \frac{2C + (n_H + n_S) c}{M}.
\]

It thus follows that, in the unique candidate for an interior optimum, the relative bargaining power of a chamber equals its share of seats: \( \alpha^* = \left( n_H^*/(n_H^* + n_S^*) \right) \). Moreover, \( n_H^* = \sigma \frac{v_S}{v_H + v_S} \sqrt{(1 - q) \frac{M}{c}} \) and \( n_S^* = \sigma \frac{v_H}{v_H + v_S} \sqrt{(1 - q) \frac{M}{c}} \), so that \( \alpha^* = (v_S/(v_H + v_S)) \), and the overall number of members of Parliament is equal to the number of members of Parliament in a unicameral system,

\[ n^* = \sigma \sqrt{(1 - q) \frac{M}{c}}. \]

Finally, the difference in welfare between a bicameral and unicameral system is:

\[ \left( \frac{v_H^2}{v_H + v_S} \right) - (C/M). \]

If \( v_H, v_S, \) and \( C \) are uncorrelated with the population of a country, this difference decreases as the size of the population increases. This implies that more populous countries are more likely to have a Senate.

**B. Nonproportional Representation**

In a nonproportional representation system, the shares of a party’s members in the population and among legislators may differ.

**Unicameral Parliament.** First, fix a realization of partisan shares \( \gamma \). Let \( k_g \) be the number of legislators who belong to party \( g \). Given that a representative agent \( i \)’s utility conditional on a nonpartisan issue arising is given by the same expression regardless of the electoral system, we here compute his utility conditional on a partisan issue arising. We call this event \( \mathcal{Q} \). This expected utility is given by

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ (x^* - x_i)^2 \mid \mathcal{Q}, \gamma \right] = -\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_g \left( x_g - \frac{G}{n} \sum_{g'=1}^{G} k_{g'} \right)^2 \right] - v_H
\]

\[
= -\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_g \left( x_g - \frac{G}{n} \sum_{g'=1}^{G} k_{g'} \right)^2 \right] - v_H
\]

\[
= -\sigma^2 \left\{ 1 - 2 \frac{k_g}{n} + \frac{G}{n^2} \sum_{g=1}^{G} \left( \frac{k_{g'}}{n} \right)^2 \right\} - v_H,
\]

where we have used that the \( x_g \) are i.i.d. draws from a distribution with a variance of \( \sigma^2 \). We have

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ (x^* - x_i)^2 \mid \mathcal{Q}, \gamma \right] = -\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_g \mathbb{E} \left[ k_g \mid \gamma \right] \right]
\]

\[
= -\sigma^2 \left\{ 1 - 2 \frac{n}{G} \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_g \mathbb{E} \left[ k_g \mid \gamma \right] \right\} - v_H.
\]

We can write \( k_g = \sum_{d=1}^{n} 1_{d,g} \), where \( 1_{d,g} \) is an indicator equal to 1 if and only if the legislator assigned to seat \( d \) \( (d \in \{1, \ldots, n\}) \), is of party \( g \), and 0 otherwise.

Thus,

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ k_g \mid \gamma \right] = \sum_{d=1}^{n} \mathbb{E} \left[ 1_{d,g} \mid \gamma \right]
\]

\[
= \sum_{d=1}^{n} \text{Pr} (1_{d,g} = 1 \mid \gamma) = n \lambda_g (\gamma),
\]

where \( \lambda_g (\gamma) := \frac{1}{n} \sum_{d=1}^{n} \text{Pr} (1_{d,g} = 1 \mid \gamma) \) is the average probability (over Parliamentary seats) that a member of party \( g \) becomes a legislator.

By the same token,

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ k_g^2 \mid \gamma \right] = \text{Var} (k_g \gamma) + \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ k_g \mid \gamma \right] \right)^2
\]

\[
= \text{Var} (k_g \gamma) + n^2 \lambda_g^2 (\gamma).
\]
Now, 

\[ (4) \quad \text{Var}(k_\gamma | \gamma) = \text{Var} \left( \sum_{d=1}^{n} \mathbf{1}_{d,g} | \gamma \right) \]

\[ = \sum_{d=1}^{n} \text{Var} (\mathbf{1}_{d,g} | \gamma) \]

\[ = n \zeta_g (\gamma), \]

where \( \zeta_g (\gamma) := \frac{1}{n} \sum_{d=1}^{n} \left[ \Pr (\mathbf{1}_{d,g} = 1 | \gamma) (1 - \Pr (\mathbf{1}_{d,g} = 1 | \gamma)) \right] \)

Thus, we have

\[ \mathbb{E} \left[ -(x^* - x_i)^2 | \mathcal{Q}, \gamma \right] = -\sigma^2 \left\{ 1 - 2 \sum_{g=1}^{G} \lambda_g (\gamma) \gamma_g + \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_g^2 (\gamma) + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{g=1}^{G} \zeta_g (\gamma) \right\} - v_H. \]

Therefore, the size of Parliament matters for the representative agent’s ex ante expected utility unless \( \text{Var}(k_\gamma | \gamma) = 0 \) for all \( g \), that is, unless the composition of Parliament is deterministic, as in a proportional voting system.

In order to reduce the dimensionality of the problem of estimating \( \Pr (\mathbf{1}_{d,g} = 1 | \gamma) \) for all \( (d, g) \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \times \{1, \ldots, G\} \) (which would be necessary to compute the \( \zeta_1, \ldots, \zeta_G \)), further assumptions on the seat-allocation process are needed. We shall discuss two simple sets of assumptions below: (1) the case of an i.i.d. allocation of seats and (2) a bonus for the biggest party.

(1) i.i.d. Allocation of Seats

In this case, \( \Pr (\mathbf{1}_{d,g} = 1 | \gamma) = \lambda_g (\gamma) \) for all seats \( d \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \). We shall furthermore assume that the allocation of seats is fair in the sense that \( \lambda_g (\gamma) = \gamma_g \) for all \( g \in \{1, \ldots, G\} \). In this case, society’s objective at the Constitutional stage is given by

\[ -\sigma^2 \left\{ \left[ 1 - \mathbb{E} \left( \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_g^2 \right) \right] + \frac{1}{n} \left( 1 - \mathbb{E} \left( \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_g^2 \right) \right) \right\} + (1 - q) \left( 1 + \frac{1}{n} \right) \} - v_H - \frac{C + nc}{M}. \]

Thus, the optimal number of members of Parliament is given by

\[ n^* = \sigma \sqrt{\frac{M}{c}} \sqrt{q (1 - \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{H}]) + 1 - q}, \]

where we write \( \mathcal{H} := \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_g^2 \) for the Herfindahl–Hirschman index of partisan fractionalization.

(2) Bonus to the Largest Group

Without loss of generality, the group \( g = 1 \), also denoted Party 1, refers to the party with the largest number of members in the population at the time of the allocation of seats. If the allocation of each seat were determined by the outcome of an election in a unique district attached to that seat, if there were no coalitions formed, if individuals voted sincerely to elect members of Parliament and if the distribution of partisan affiliations were homogeneous across districts, Party 1 would win all seats in Parliament. Although all these assumptions may fail in countries that use nonproportional voting systems, the party that represents the largest share of the population may still have some advantage over other parties.

To formalize that advantage, we assume that party \( g = 1 \) automatically wins a proportion \( 1 - \xi \) of seats. In the remaining proportion \( \xi \) of the \( n \) seats, we make the assumption that the seat allocations are i.i.d., with the probability that a seat is allocated to party \( g \) equal to its share of partisans in the overall population. This assumption is motivated by the fact that, in practice, at the time of the design of Parliamentary institutions, the Parliament Designers may not know perfectly how individuals will migrate from one district to another, or may not even know how district boundaries will be defined, etc. We examine this assumption empirically in Appendix B.

Thus, we have \( \lambda_1 (\gamma) = 1 - \xi (1 - \gamma_1) \), \( \lambda_g (\gamma) = \xi \gamma_g \) for \( g \neq 1 \), \( \zeta_1 (\gamma) = \xi (1 - \gamma_1) (1 - \xi (1 - \gamma_1)) \), and \( \zeta_g (\gamma) = \xi \gamma_g (1 - \xi \gamma_g) \) for \( g \neq 1 \). Using this in our expression for \( \mathbb{E} \left[ -(x^* - x_i)^2 | \mathcal{Q}, \gamma \right] \), we find

\[ \mathbb{E} \left[ -(x^* - x_i)^2 | \mathcal{Q}, \gamma \right] = \]

\[ -\sigma^2 \left\{ \left[ 1 + (1 - \xi)^2 (1 - 2 \gamma_1) - \xi (2 - \xi) \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_g^2 \right] + \frac{\xi}{n} \left[ 2 (1 - \gamma_1 (1 - \xi)) - \xi \left( 1 + \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_g^2 \right) \right] \right\} - v_H. \]
Thus, society’s objective at the Constitutional stage is given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma^2 & \left\{ q \left[ 1 + (1 - \xi)^2 \left( 1 - 2\mathbb{E}[\gamma_1] \right) - \xi (2 - \xi) \right] \\
& \quad + \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g^2 \right] + \frac{\xi}{n} \left[ 2 (1 - \mathbb{E}[\gamma_1] (1 - \xi)) \right] \\
& \quad - \xi \left( 1 + \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g^2 \right] \right) \right\] \\
& \quad + (1 - q) \left( 1 + \frac{1}{n_H} \right) - \nu_H - \frac{C + nc}{M}.
\end{align*}
\]

Optimizing over \( n \) gives us the optimal size of Parliament,

\[
n^* = \sigma \sqrt{\frac{M}{c}} \\
\sqrt{1 - q + q \xi \left[ 2 (1 - \mathbb{E}[\gamma_1] (1 - \xi)) - \xi (1 + \mathbb{E}[H]) \right]}.
\]

We note that the case \( \xi = 1 \) corresponds to our previous i.i.d. case.

For \( \xi = 0 \) and given \( \gamma \), there is no uncertainty concerning the partisan composition of the legislature, as party \( g = 1 \) will capture all the seats. Thus, as in the case of proportional voting, the number of Parliamentary seats matters only when it comes to nonpartisan issues. It is therefore no surprise that, in this case, the optimal size of Parliament corresponds to that under proportional representation.

**Bicameral Parliament.** We now examine the case of a bicameral system in a nonproportional system. The representative agent’s ex ante expected utility, conditional on a partisan issue arising, is given by

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ - (x^* - x_i)^2 \mid \theta, \gamma \right]
\]

\[
= -\sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g \mathbb{E} \left[ \left( x_g - \alpha \sum_{g'=1}^G \frac{k_{g'}^H}{n_H} x_{g'} \right) \right] \\
\quad - (1 - \alpha) \sum_{g'=1}^G \frac{k_{g'}^S}{n_S} x_{g'} \right] \mid \gamma \right) \\
- \sigma^2 v_H - (1 - \alpha)^2 v_S,
\]

where \( k_X^X \) is the number of legislators of party \( g \) in chamber \( X \).

One shows by calculations similar to those above that

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ - (x^* - x_i)^2 \mid \theta, \gamma \right] = -\sigma^2 \left\{ 1 - 2 \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g \right. \\
\quad \left( \alpha \mathbb{E} \left[ k_{g}^H \mid \gamma \right] + \frac{1 - \alpha}{n_S} \mathbb{E} \left[ k_{g}^S \mid \gamma \right] \right) \\
\quad + \sum_{g=1}^G \left( \alpha \lambda_{g}^H (\gamma) + (1 - \alpha) \lambda_{g}^S (\gamma) \right)^2 \\
\quad \left. + \sum_{g=1}^G \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{n_H} m_{g}^H (\gamma) + \frac{1 - \alpha^2}{n_S} m_{g}^S (\gamma) \right) \right] \\
- \alpha^2 v_H - (1 - \alpha)^2 v_S,
\]

where \( \lambda_{g}^X (\gamma) \) denotes the average probability over districts that a candidate of party \( g \) is elected to chamber \( X \), and \( m_{g}^X (\gamma) \) is the arithmetic mean (over districts) of the variance of the random variable \( 1_{d,g}^X \) conditional on \( \gamma \). The random variable \( 1_{d,g}^X \) is 1 if a candidate of party \( g \) is elected to chamber \( X \) for the seat \( d \), and 0 otherwise.

To make further predictions, we again analyze the i.i.d. case and the case of a bonus to the largest party, as above.

(1) **i.i.d. Allocation of Seats**

In this case, (8) simplifies to

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ - (x^* - x_i)^2 \mid \theta, \gamma \right] = -\sigma^2 \left\{ 1 + \frac{\alpha^2}{n_H} \right. \\
\quad \left. + \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{n_S} \right] \\
\quad (1 - H) - \alpha^2 v_H - (1 - \alpha)^2 v_S,
\]

where \( H = \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g^2 \) again denotes the Herfindahl–Hirschman index of partisan fractionalization. At the Constitutional stage, society
maximizes
\[-\sigma^2 \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha^2}{n_H} + \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{n_S} \right) [q(1 - \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{H}])] + 1 - q - \alpha^2 v_H - (1 - \alpha)^2 v_S \]
\[-2C + (n_H + n_S) c \]
and the optimum is given by
\[\alpha^* = \left( v_S / (v_H + v_S) \right), \]
\[n_H^* = \sigma \alpha^* \sqrt{\frac{M}{c_H}} \sqrt{q(1 - \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{H}]) + 1 - q}, \]
\[n_S^* = \sigma (1 - \alpha^*) \sqrt{\frac{M}{c_S}} \sqrt{q(1 - \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{H}]) + 1 - q}, \]

implying
\[n^* = \sigma \sqrt{q(1 - \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{H}]) + 1 - q \sqrt{\frac{M}{c}}}, \]
as in the unicameral case.

(2) Bonus to the Largest Group

Straightforward calculations show
\[\mathbb{E} \left[ - (x^* - x_i)^2 \bigg| \Omega, \mathcal{Y} \right] = \]
\[-\sigma^2 \left\{ 1 + (1 - \xi)^2 (1 - 2\gamma_1) - \xi (2 - \xi) \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g^2 \right\} + \xi \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{n_H} + \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{n_S} \right) \right] \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g^2 \right] \}
\[+ \xi \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{n_H} + \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{n_S} \right) \right] \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g^2 \right] \}
\[-\xi \left( 1 + \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g^2 \right) \right] \} - \alpha^2 v_H - (1 - \alpha)^2 v_S. \]

Thus, society’s objective at the Constitutional stage is given by
\[-\sigma^2 \left\{ q \left[ 1 + (1 - \xi)^2 \left( 1 - 2 \mathbb{E} [\gamma_1] \right) \right] \right\} - \xi \left( 2 - \xi \right) \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g^2 \right] \]
\[+ \xi \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{n_H} + \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{n_S} \right) \right] \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g^2 \right] \}
\[-\xi \left( 1 + \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_g^2 \right] \right) \} \]
\[+ (1 - q) \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha^2}{n_H} + \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{n_S} \right) \} - \alpha^2 v_H \]
\[-(1 - \alpha)^2 v_S - 2C + (n_H + n_S) c \]

Optimizing, we again find
\[\alpha^* = \left( v_S / (v_S + v_H) \right), \]
and for the optimal total number of legislators
\[n^* = \sigma \sqrt{\frac{M}{c}} \sqrt{1 - q + q \xi [2 \left( 1 - \mathbb{E} [\gamma_1] (1 - \xi) \right) - \xi \left( 1 + \mathbb{E} [\mathcal{H}] \right)]}, \]
as in the unicameral setting. As before, \(\alpha = n_H^*/n^*, or n_H^* = \alpha n^* \) and \(n_S^* = (1 - \alpha) n^*. \)

Both models (1) and (2) predict that the trade-off between a unicameral and a bicameral system is the same as under a proportional voting system, implying that a bicameral system is better if and only if
\[\left( v_H^2 / (v_H + v_S) \right) \geq \left( C / M \right). \]

Thus, a country’s choice of bicameralism depends on the size of its population, but does not depend on its voting system or its level of partisan fractionalization.

C. Predictions

This analysis yields the following predictions.

Prediction 1. The log of the number of legislators is linearly increasing in the log of the size of the population, with a coefficient close to 0.5.

Prediction 2. The number of legislators is independent of whether a Parliament is unicameral or bicameral.

Prediction 3. In bicameral systems, the relative bargaining power of a given chamber is equal to the share of legislators sitting in this chamber.

Prediction 4. More populous countries are more likely to have a bicameral Parliament.

Prediction 5. The factors that impact the size of Parliament in the model (except the size of the population) have no impact on the probability that a country has a bicameral Parliament.

Prediction 6. In proportional systems, the level of partisan fractionalization has no impact on the size of Parliament. The log of the size of Parliament is:
\[\log n = \log \sigma + 0.5 \log M - 0.5 \log c \]
\[+ 0.5 \log (1 - q). \]
Prediction 7. In nonproportional voting systems, for a given $q$ and $\xi$, the log-linearization of Equation (12) implies that the log of the size of Parliament is:

$$
\log n = \log \sigma + 0.5 \log M - 0.5 \log c + 0.5 \log (1 - q + q \xi [2 (1 - \mathbb{E} [\gamma]) (1 - \xi)]) - \xi (1 + \mathbb{E} [\mathcal{X}]) .
$$

Approximating the last term, we have:

$$
\log n \approx \log \sigma + 0.5 \log M - 0.5 \log c + 0.5 \log (1 - q) - 0.5 \frac{q}{1 - q} \xi^2 \mathbb{E} [\mathcal{X}]
$$

$$
-0.5 \frac{q}{1 - q} (2 \xi (1 - \xi) \mathbb{E} [\gamma] + \xi^2 - 2 \xi) .
$$

V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

A. Methodology

This section documents a certain number of empirical regularities of Parliamentary institutions across countries. The size of the sample, small by nature, and the lack of exogenous sources of variation in the explanatory variables limit causal inference. With this caveat in mind, we formulate the identification assumptions of all estimations, but do not discuss their plausibility. Instead, we discuss the results of the estimations in the context of the predictions of the model.

Data. The estimations use data from the DPI 2012 (Beck et al. 2001 [last update in 2012]). These data contain information, for almost every country and every year between 1975 and 2012, concerning the number of chambers, the number of members of either chamber, the voting system (proportional/nonproportional), and electoral outcomes in election years, namely vote shares and seat shares across parties, for the Lower Chamber. Population by country comes from the World Bank Database. To assess the “degree of democratization,” we use the Polity IV score from Polity data. These data indicate the Polity IV score of most countries for every year between 1800 and 2015. The Polity IV score ranges from −10 to 10, and is used to partition regimes into “Autocracies” (score between −10 and −6), and other regimes.

Sample of Observations. The longest period covered by all the data sources spans 1975 to 2012 (with some missing information). Many countries have been governed by an autocratic regime for at least some years of that period. Since we consider that our model does not explain the institutional features of such regimes, we aim to exclude these observations from our sample. To do so, we include only “Nonautocratic” regimes in the Polity IV classification (i.e., we exclude countries with a score between −10 and −6 in 2012).

In addition, we exclude countries that have not had at least two legislative elections for which no party obtained all the votes and there were no reports of substantial fraud (the DPI contains a binary variable that indicates whether an election was marred by fraud).

Since observations in a country across years usually cannot be considered independent—for instance, the size of the U.S. Congress over the whole period is 535, due to a rule set in 1911—we run all regressions on a sample of data with a unique observation by country.

Definition of Variables. To assess the value of institutional variables unrelated to electoral outcomes (the number of chambers of Parliament, the size of each chamber of Parliament) of a country, which are all nonrandom, we use the observation for 2012. To assess the size of the population of that country, we use the observation at the time of the most recent change in those institutional variables before 2012. To assess the values of variables related to electoral outcomes, which may be random, we compute their empirical means over all the elections (with no fraud reported and with more than one party) that took place between 1975 and 2012.

17. There is no information on Upper Chamber elections. In fact, in many countries (e.g., in the United Kingdom or in Canada), members of the Upper Chamber are not elected.

18. The data are available on the Polity IV website http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.

19. This restriction excludes countries that may have had more than one election, but for which there is no electoral information.

20. Including many years of observations would artificially increase the significance of the impact of any variable that changes little between 1975 and 2012, such as the size of the Parliament, the population, the number of chambers, and so on.

21. In most countries, Parliament features change “regularly.” Only a few countries have not changed the number of Parliamentary seats since 1975.

22. All results are similar if we use 2012 population levels for all countries instead.
As in the model, Party 1 refers to the party that, in a given election, obtained the largest share of the total number of votes in the country.23

The variables related to electoral outcomes are the Herfindahl–Hirschman index of partisan fractionalization \( H = \sum \gamma^2 \), the share of total votes obtained by Party 1, \( \gamma_1 \), and \( \xi \). The actual value of \( H \) and \( \gamma_1 \) for any democratic election that took place between 1975 and 2012 can be computed directly from the data, and we use their empirical means over democratic elections as proxy variables for their expected values.24

Conversely, the actual value of \( \xi \) cannot be obtained directly from any variable in the data. In fact 1–\( \xi \), which we informally refer to as “the bonus to the largest party,” may depend on many institutional features—such as redistricting rules—that cannot be easily quantified. Instead, to assess the value of \( \xi \), we use the fact that, by definition, the expected proportion of seats won by Party 1, \( E[\gamma_1] \), is \( E[1 - \xi + \xi \gamma_1] \).

The proxy variable for \( \xi \) is then \( \frac{1 - E[\gamma_1]}{1 - E[\gamma_1]} \), where we use averages across elections to estimate the expectations in the equation.25,26

Appendix A reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis.

**Specification.** The basic specification for the estimations is:

\[
\log n_k = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log M_k + \beta_2 \xi_k + \beta_3 \gamma_1 \xi_k + \beta_4 \frac{\xi_k}{1 - \xi_k} + \varepsilon_k
\]

with one observation by country \( k \), and where \( M_k \) is the size of the population, \( E[H]_k \) is the average Herfindahl–Hirschman index across democratic elections in country \( k \), \( E[\gamma_1]_k \) is the average share of votes obtained by Party 1 in country \( k \) across democratic elections, \( \xi_k \) is the ratio of one minus the average share of seats obtained by Party 1 across democratic elections over one minus the average share of votes obtained by Party 1 across democratic elections in country \( k \). The dependent variable \( \log n_k \) is the log of the total number of members of Parliament in country \( k \).

Equation (16) does not include variables for which there is no information (\( c \)) or that have no obvious empirical proxy (\( q \) and \( \sigma \)).

Predictions 6 and 7 imply that:

- Under any voting system, the model predicts \( \beta_1 = 0.5 \).
- Under a proportional voting system, \( \xi \) is equal to 1, \( \beta_2 = 0 \). Term (3) and the intercept would be collinear in theory, yet in practice, if \( \xi_k = 1 + u_k \) where \( u_k \) is some random error of mean 0—due for instance to integer problems in the attribution of seats—we may have \( \beta_3 = 0 \).
- Under a nonproportional voting system with an i.i.d. distribution of seats across parties, \( \xi \) is equal to 1, \( \beta_2 = -0.5 \frac{q}{1-q} \), which implies that \( \beta_2 < 0 \). Term (3) and the intercept would be collinear in theory, yet in practice, as under a proportional voting system, we may have \( \beta_3 = 0 \).
- Under a nonproportional voting system that gives a bonus of seats to Party 1, \( \beta_2 = -0.5 \frac{q}{1-q} \) and \( \beta_3 = -0.5 \frac{q}{1-q} \), which implies that \( \beta_2 < 0 \), \( \beta_3 < 0 \), and \( \beta_2 = \beta_3 \).

**B. Results of the Estimations**

Table 1 reports the estimation of the coefficients of Equation (16) for the sample of nonautocratic regimes. The identification assumptions are: (1) The unobservable variables that also affect the size of Parliament of a country, that is, the variance of bliss points \( \sigma^2 \) and the salaries of members of Parliament, are not correlated with the size of the population, the probability of bicameralism, or the terms specific to partisan issues. (2) The total number of seats in Parliament has no impact on the size of the population, the probability of bicameralism, or the terms specific to partisan issues.

Column 1 shows that the log-linear relationship from the model holds, with a coefficient close to 0.5, which is consistent with Prediction 1.

In column 2, we include as a covariate a binary variable equal to 1 if and only if country \( k \) has a bicameral system. This variable has no significant impact on the log of the size of Parliament, which is consistent with Prediction 2.
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<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herfindahl–Hirschman $\mathcal{E}[\mathcal{H}]$</td>
<td>−0.801**</td>
<td>−0.345</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−1.049*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.367)</td>
<td>(0.588)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.525)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi^2 \times \mathcal{E}[\mathcal{H}]$</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.767**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.399</td>
<td></td>
<td>−1.049**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.600)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.463)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2 \times \xi \times (1 - \xi) \times \mathcal{E}[\gamma_1] + \xi^2 - 2 \times \xi$</td>
<td>−0.847**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td></td>
<td>−1.132**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.482)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicameral Parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.147</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting system</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Nonproportional</td>
<td>Nonproportional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Observations</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.825</td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>0.879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald p value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the estimation of the regression of the log of the total number of members of Parliament on the log of population and other covariates. There is one observation by country. The sample comprises all countries that were not autocratic in 2012 in the Polity IV classification and that have had at least two elections with no party getting all the votes and without reported fraud between 1975 and 2012. See Section V for details. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Sources: DPI; Polity; World Bank.
TABLE 2
Probability to Have a Bicameral Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
<th>(10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log population</td>
<td>0.067**</td>
<td>0.062**</td>
<td>0.073**</td>
<td>0.080**</td>
<td>0.076**</td>
<td>0.090***</td>
<td>0.074**</td>
<td>0.077**</td>
<td>0.068**</td>
<td>0.066**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional voting</td>
<td>−0.138 (0.116)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herfindahl–Hirschman $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{H}]$</td>
<td>0.582 (0.492)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi^2 \times \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{H}]$</td>
<td>0.506 (0.430)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2 \times \xi \times (1 - \xi) \times \mathbb{E}[\gamma 1] + \xi^2 - 2 \times \xi$</td>
<td>0.686 (0.448)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic $F$ [1]</td>
<td>0.062 (0.243)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic $F$ [1]</td>
<td>−0.006 (0.231)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious $F$ [1]</td>
<td>0.370 (0.241)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic $F$ [2]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.019 (0.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic $P$ [3]</td>
<td>0.335 (0.229)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious $P$ [3]</td>
<td>−0.089 (0.185)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Observations</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the estimation of the regression of a binary variable equal to 1 if and only if the country has a bicameral Parliament, on the log of population and other covariates. There is one observation by country. The sample comprises all countries that were not autocratic in 2012 in the Polity IV classification and that have had at least two elections with no party getting all the votes and without reported fraud between 1975 and 2012. $F$ [1], $F$ [2], $P$ [3] refer respectively to the Fractionalization indices of Alesina et al. (2003), the Fractionalization index of Desmet, Ortuno-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012), and the Polarization indices of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a, 2005b). See Section V for details. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Sources: DPI; Polity; World Bank.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 show that the coefficients of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (column 3), or of the second and third terms of Equation (16) (column 4) have the sign predicted by the model for a nonproportional voting system. These results are consistent with the fact that the coefficients are each some average of the coefficient in the proportional voting system (which is null) and in the nonproportional system (which is negative).

In fact, if we restrict the sample to countries with a Proportional voting system (columns 5 and 6), we find no statistically significant impact of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, or of the coefficients of the second and third terms of Equation (16), which is consistent with Prediction 6.

If we then restrict the sample to countries with a nonproportional voting system (columns 7 and 8), we find a negative and statistically significant impact of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, as well as of the coefficients of the second term of Equation (16), which is consistent with Prediction 7.

Column 8 also shows that the coefficient of the third term is negative, statistically significant, and close to the value of the coefficient of the second term. The $p$ value of a Wald test of the hypothesis $H_0: \beta_2 = \beta_3$, reported at the bottom of column 8, shows that we cannot reject the possibility that these coefficients are equal at the 0.05 (or 0.1) level of significance. These results are consistent with Prediction 7 in the case of a “bonus to the largest group.”

Remark. These results may be used to assess the probability $q$ that a partisan issue arises, a parameter that has no obvious measurable equivalent. We have here that $0.5 - \frac{q}{1-q}$ is around 1, so that $q$ is around 67%.

To assess Prediction 3, we rely on Bradbury and Crain (2001) who provide the only estimation
of the ratio in the bargaining powers of the Lower and the Upper Chamber across countries, that is, $\alpha^*/(1 - \alpha^*)$ with the previous notations. They find that the ratio of bargaining powers is 3.5 on average. This means that $\alpha^*$ is around 0.78 on average across countries. With our data on the sizes of Lower and Upper Chambers, we estimate that the ratio of the number of members of the Lower Chamber over the total number of members of a Parliament is equal to 0.73 on average among nonautocratic regimes. This average is very close to the estimate of Bradbury and Crain (2001).

Table 2 examines the determinants of an Upper Chamber. The identification assumptions are: (1) The unobservable variables that also affect the probability of bicameralism, that is, square means of the error terms and the fixed cost of an extra Chamber, are not correlated with the size of the population, the voting system in place, or the terms specific to partisan issues. (2) The probability of bicameralism has no causal impact on the size of the population, the voting system in place, or the terms specific to partisan issues.

In column 1, we regress a binary variable equal to 1 if and only if the country has a Bicameral Parliament on the log of the population of a country. We find that larger countries are significantly more likely to have a Senate, which is consistent with Prediction 4.

In column 2, we include a covariate equal to 1 if and only if the country has a Proportional voting system. This variable is not significantly correlated with the dependent variable, which is consistent with Prediction 5.

In columns 3 and 4, we find no impact of the other terms considered before. In particular, countries with greater partisan fractionalization are not significantly more likely to have a Senate. This finding might be interpreted as somewhat disputing the view that the role of second chambers is primarily to afford representation to otherwise under-represented minorities. To further examine this point, we also present additional estimations that use measures of ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization ($F$) and polarization ($P$) presented in Alesina et al. (2003) ([1] in the table), Desmet, Ortuno-Ortin, and Wacziarg (2012) ([2] in the table), and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a, 2005b) ([3] in the table). No indicator has any effect on the coefficient of the log of the population on the probability to have a Senate.28

VI. CONCLUSION

We have analyzed a simple model of Parliamentary institutions, testing the consistency of its predictions with cross-country data. We have seen that the log of the size of a country’s Parliament increases in a linear manner with the log of the size of its population. The size of a country’s Parliament does not depend on whether it is unicameral or bicameral. In bicameral systems, the relative weight of a chamber should correspond to the share of legislators sitting in this chamber. Furthermore, the only observable variable impacting the probability that a given country has a bicameral Parliament is the size of its population.

A second set of results pertains to the impact of partisan fractionalization and voting systems on Parliament size. We find that the mode of election has no impact on the probability that a given country has a second chamber, and that greater fractionalization increases the size of a country’s Parliament if and only if it has a nonproportional voting system. In proportional systems, fractionalization has no impact.

Our model could be extended in several ways. For instance, we do not model the bargaining process among legislators, assuming instead that legislators within a given chamber act cooperatively and do not take the bargaining process with the other chamber into account. Whether it would be possible to account for the huge cross-country differences in Parliamentary procedures in a richer model, which would focus on a smaller subset of countries, and whether such a model would preserve, or possibly even increase, the predictive power of our model, is an interesting question for future research.

Furthermore, we have made the assumption that, in a bicameral system, errors are uncorrelated across chambers. This is clearly a strong assumption, made for the purpose of tractability, as one could well imagine both chambers falling under the sway of the same lobbying efforts or similar mood swings in published opinion, making for positively correlated errors. On the

27. If we restrict the sample to the sample of countries used in Bradbury and Crain’s (2001) estimations, the share is 0.74.

28. This result does not mean that ethnic, linguistic, or religious diversity has no impact on the setup of a country’s Parliament. In fact, diversity might affect the number of members of Parliament if, for instance, it had an impact on $q$ or $\sigma$. 

other hand, in our simple model, the Constitution Designers would endeavor to ensure that the errors are as negatively correlated as possible. Indeed, in reality, many countries use different modes of selection for the two chambers of their Parliaments, which one could arguably interpret as one way of effecting a negative correlation between the errors they are prone to. Furthermore, in many bicameral systems, there are important design differences across chambers, from which we have abstracted in our analysis. Indeed, sometimes, the second chamber is malapportioned in such a way as to over-represent some minority, as is the case, for example, with smaller states in the United States. One could view the fact that often only one chamber is malapportioned in this way as an attempt by the Constitution Designers to induce negatively correlated errors between chambers. We recommend for future research a more detailed investigation of differences between chambers in bicameral systems.

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND GRAPH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population in million</td>
<td>41.33</td>
<td>137.48</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1,127.14</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Parliament</td>
<td>253.14</td>
<td>220.97</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Lower Chamber/House</td>
<td>211.84</td>
<td>171.63</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Upper Chamber/Senate</td>
<td>87.31</td>
<td>82.25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicameral Parliament</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional voting system</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of legislators in Lower Chamber</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herfindahl–Hirschman index $\mathcal{H}$</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi^2 \times \mathcal{H}$</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2 \times \xi \times (1 - \xi) \times \gamma_1 + \xi^2 - 2 \times \xi$</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-3.63</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for all nonautocratic countries in 2012. The size of the population is measured at the time of the most recent change in Parliament features before 2012. The electoral outcomes terms $\mathcal{H}$, $\xi$, $\xi^2 \times \mathcal{H}$ and $2 \times \xi \times (1 - \xi) \times \gamma_1 + \xi^2 - 2 \times \xi$ are the empirical averages of these terms over legislative elections that took place between 1975 and 2012. The number of members in a chamber may differ from the number of seats in that chamber if some seats are not taken up.

Sources: DPI; Polity; World Bank.
APPENDIX B: EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BONUS TO THE LARGEST GROUP ASSUMPTION

In this section, we present a series of estimations that use data of the DPI at the election and party level, for any election that took place between 1975 and 2012.

To do so, we use the data’s detailed information on shares of seats and votes obtained by the largest parties across elections to test the main implication of this assumption, namely that there exists \( \xi \) such that:

\[
\mathbb{E}[\lambda_g] = \xi \times \mathbb{E}[\gamma_g] + (1 - \xi) \times 1_g
\]

with the notations of the model, and where \( 1_g = 1 \) is a binary variable equal to 1 if and only if \( g = 1 \), and 0 otherwise.

As mentioned in Section V, we do not observe \( \xi \) directly, but infer its value from solving Equation (A1) with \( g = 1 \).

Empirically, we find that, in nonproportional voting systems, \( \xi \) is equal to 0.89 on average (whereas it is equal to 0.98 on average in proportional systems). This estimation indicates that countries that use nonproportional voting systems indeed give an advantage to the party with the largest share of votes in the country, which amounts to 11% of House seats on average.

Our estimation method for \( \xi \) implies that Equation (A1) is trivially satisfied for Party 1 empirically. It is also trivially satisfied empirically in elections with only two parties. We therefore focus on estimating the relation between the shares of seats and votes for parties \( g > 1 \) only in elections with three parties or more.

The basic specification we use here is:

\[
\text{Seats Share}_{k,g,t} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \cdot \xi_k \times \text{Votes Share}_{k,g,t} + \sum_{r=2}^{G-1} \delta_r \cdot \text{Party rank}_{k,g,t} + \varepsilon_{k,g,t}
\]

where \( \text{Seats Share}_{k,g,t} \) is the share of seats and \( \text{Votes Share}_{k,g,t} \) is the share of total votes obtained by party \( g \) in country \( k \) for the election that took place in year \( t \). \( \xi_k \) is defined as before for country \( k \), and \( \text{Party rank}_{k,g,t} \) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if and only if party \( g \) is
TABLE A2

Distribution of Seat Shares in Nonproportional Voting Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seats Share</th>
<th>(\xi \times \text{Votes Share} )</th>
<th>(\text{Party rank} = 2)</th>
<th>(\text{Party rank} = 3)</th>
<th>(\text{Party rank} = 4)</th>
<th>(\text{Party rank} = 5)</th>
<th>(\text{Party rank} = 6)</th>
<th>(\text{Party rank} = 7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>((1))</td>
<td>((2))</td>
<td>((3))</td>
<td>((4))</td>
<td>((5))</td>
<td>((6))</td>
<td>((7))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.817***)</td>
<td>(0.943***)</td>
<td>(1.095***)</td>
<td>(0.936***)</td>
<td>(1.284***)</td>
<td>(1.173***)</td>
<td>(0.982***)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((0.0147))</td>
<td>((0.146))</td>
<td>((0.104))</td>
<td>((0.176))</td>
<td>((0.236))</td>
<td>((0.071))</td>
<td>((0.069))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(-0.014)</td>
<td>(-0.012)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((0.065))</td>
<td>((0.043))</td>
<td>((0.030))</td>
<td>((0.061))</td>
<td>((0.038))</td>
<td>((0.017))</td>
<td>((0.023))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-0.022)</td>
<td>(-0.034^*)</td>
<td>(-0.003)</td>
<td>(-0.026)</td>
<td>(-0.030)</td>
<td>(-0.016)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>((0.013))</td>
<td>((0.016))</td>
<td>((0.013))</td>
<td>((0.022))</td>
<td>((0.019))</td>
<td>((0.010))</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(-0.007)</td>
<td>(-0.043^*)</td>
<td>(-0.022)</td>
<td>(-0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>((0.009))</td>
<td>((0.009))</td>
<td>((0.021))</td>
<td>((0.015))</td>
<td>((0.008))</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(-0.027)</td>
<td>(-0.020^*)</td>
<td>(-0.002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>((0.013))</td>
<td>((0.016))</td>
<td>((0.010))</td>
<td>((0.007))</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-0.013)</td>
<td>(-0.006)</td>
<td>(-0.002)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((0.008))</td>
<td>((0.007))</td>
<td>((0.006))</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(-0.005^*)</td>
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<th># Parties</th>
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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<td># Observations</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>666</td>
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R²: 0.926 0.900 0.898 0.865 0.933 0.962 0.923

Wald p value

H0: \(\delta = 1\)

\(\frac{0.238}{0.702} \frac{0.371}{0.723} \frac{0.263}{0.061} \frac{0.795}{0.923}\)

Notes: This table reports the estimation of the regression 34. The dependent variable is the share of seats in the House that party \(g\) in country \(k\) obtained after the election in year \(t\). There is one observation by country, party, and election year. All estimations include a fixed effect for any country and election-year pair. The sample comprises all countries that were not autocratic in 2012 in the Polity IV classification and that have had at least two elections with no party getting all the votes and without reported fraud between 1975 and 2012. See Section V for details. Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses.

*\(p < .05\); **\(p < .01\); ***\(p < .001\).

Sources: DPI; Polity; World Bank.

These estimations show first that the coefficient of the term \(\xi \times \text{Votes Share}_{g,t}\) is significantly different from 0, and close to 1. In fact, the \(p\) value of a Wald test indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient of \(\xi \times \text{Votes Share}_{g,t}\) is equal to 1. This result is consistent with Equation (A1) above.

The estimations also show that most indicator variables \(\text{Party rank} = r_{k,g,t}\) have no significant effect at the 5% level, and none when all observations are included (column 7). This result means that a party that obtains a share of votes such that it would be of rank \(r\) has no significant advantage or disadvantage in terms of Parliamentary seats (with respect to the party with the largest rank, which is the reference group in these estimations). On average across countries, we thus cannot reject at the 5% level the hypothesis that the share of votes and the share of seats (deflated by the factor \(\xi\)), are the same.

APPENDIX C: A TWO-STAGE VOTING GAME

In a proportional voting system, the allocation of seats that we assume here is the outcome of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium that is coalition proof in the following sense.

A coalition is defined by a vector \(\omega = (\theta_1, \eta_1, \ldots, \theta_G, \eta_G) \in \{0,1\} \times [0,1]^G\), such that the share of seats obtained by the coalition that are attributed to

ranked \(rth\) in decreasing order of vote shares in country \(k\) for the election that took place in year \(t\). We also include as covariates the fixed effects of any country/election year. (The \(\text{Party rank} = G\) variable is excluded to avoid collinearity with the constant term. The party with the smallest share of votes is thus the reference group.) Standard errors are clustered by country to account for the fact that error terms are correlated within countries.

Table A2 reports the estimation of this regression separately for all elections with a given number of parties running—from three to eight parties—and for all elections.29-30

29. The data do not give information on more than nine parties, so that they may aggregate both votes and seats for elections with more than eight parties. By definition, including elections with more than eight parties would create a measurement error that would bias the estimations of the coefficients.

30. The electoral system of a country may give an advantage or a disadvantage to the smallest party instead of a party of some given rank \(r\). Reporting estimations on subsamples of observations partitioned by number of parties allows to check whether this is indeed the case. There are not enough observations by country to run the regression separately for every country, which would provide an even stronger test of the assumption.

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party $g$ is $0, \eta_g$, with $\sum_{g}^G \theta_g \eta_g = 1$. We say that $g$ belongs to the coalition $\omega$ if $\theta_g = 1$. In other words, a coalition is defined by its members and by a contract $(\eta_1, \ldots, \eta_G)$ that specifies how the seats won in the chamber will be shared among them.

Let $\Omega$ denote the set of all possible coalitions, and $\Omega_g$ the set of all possible coalitions that $g$ belongs to.

We consider the following two-stage game.

Stage 1. Suppose each party is headed by a party leader who may agree on behalf of the party to form a coalition with one or several other parties. The party leader wants to maximize the share of seats of his party. In the first stage, every party $g$’s leader chooses a unique $\omega \in \Omega_g$. Coalition $\omega$ is running in the election if and only if all parties that belong to $\omega$ have chosen it. Otherwise, we impose that all parties that picked $\omega$ run independently. Let $\Omega \{\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_G\} \in 2^G$ be the set of coalitions or parties that run in the election for a given vector $(\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_G)$.

Stage 2. In the second stage, every individual observes parties’ choices, and casts a vote for a coalition (or a party) that is actually running. An individual $i$’s strategy is defined by a function $\Omega^G \to \Omega$ which sets, for any vector of choices $(\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_G)$, which coalition (or party) $\omega \in \Omega$ individual $i$ will vote for, and by the constraint that $\omega \in \Omega (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_G)$, that is, that $i$ cannot vote for a coalition that is not running in the election.

Information. At the time of the election, individuals’ partisan affiliations are publicly known, but the type of issue to arise and individual bliss points are unknown. This assumption aims to account for citizens’ imperfect information on the details of the issue that will come before the legislators to whom they delegate decision power. Over the course of a term, legislators may have to address unexpected issues, for instance, a domestic or international crisis, or to acquire more information on an issue before deciding on a policy.

After the election, the type of issue is realized, individual bliss points are known, and the policy adopted is as in Equation (1) of Section III.

To simplify notations, we assume, in this section only, that the issue is partisan, that error terms $Z_k$ are null, that the Parliament is unicameral, and that $C=c=0$. The results are the same if we relax all these assumptions, and use the assumptions of the general model instead.

Lemma 1. In any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, any party necessarily obtains a share of seats equal to its share of partisans in the population.

Proof. Consider the second stage first. Let $i$ be an individual who belongs to party $g$, but who is not a legislator. For a partisan issue, individual $i$’s expected utility is

$$-\sigma^2 \left[ 1 - \lambda_{g} \right]^2 - \sigma^2 \sum_{g'=1, g' \neq g} G \left( \lambda_{g'} \right)^2.$$  

where $\lambda_{g'}$ is the share of seats obtained by party $g'$ in Parliament. This term can be rewritten:

$$-\sigma^2 \left[ 1 - \lambda_{g} \right]^2 - \sigma^2 \sum_{g'=1, g' \neq g} G \left( \lambda_{g'} \right)^2.$$  

This term is increasing in $\lambda_{g} \in [0, 1]$ and decreasing in $\lambda_{g'} \in [0, 1]$ for $g' \neq g$.

Let $\lambda_{g'} \geq 0$ be the share of seats obtained by party $g' \in [1, \ldots, G)$ without individual $i$’s vote. $i$’s vote counts for $1/M$ of the total share of votes, so, by definition of a proportional voting system, $\sum_{g'=} G \lambda_{g'} = 1 - (1/M)$.

If party $g$ runs independently and $i$ votes for it, $i$’s payoff is:

$$A = -\sigma^2 \left\{ \left( 1 - \lambda_{g} \right)^2 - \sum_{g'=1, g' \neq g} G \lambda_{g'}^2 \right\}.$$  

If party $g$ runs independently and $i$ votes for a coalition or for a party other than $g$, his vote will add some $\varepsilon_{g'}$ to $\lambda_{g'}$, where $0 \leq \varepsilon_{g'} \leq (1/M)$ and $\sum_{g' \neq g} \varepsilon_{g'} = (1/M)$. Individual $i$’s payoff is then:

$$B = -\sigma^2 \left\{ \left( 1 - \lambda_{g} \right)^2 + \sum_{g'=1, g' \neq g} G \left( \lambda_{g'} + \varepsilon_{g'} \right)^2 \right\}.$$  

The monotonicity in $\lambda_{g} \in [0, 1]$ and $\lambda_{g'} \in [0, 1]$ implies that $A > B$. Therefore, any party that runs independently will obtain a share of seats that is at least equal to its share of partisans in the population.

In the first stage, no party will choose a coalition unless $\forall g \in \Omega_g \in 2^G$ is the share of seats obtained by party $g$ in the second stage, as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.

Lemma 2. A situation in which all parties choose to run independently in the first stage and each individual votes for his own party in the second stage is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.

Proof. In such a situation, a deviation by any one party will not change the set of coalitions running, since no coalition can be formed after a unique deviation.

References


33. If $i$ votes for a coalition, $\varepsilon_{g'}$ may depend on the contract that defines that coalition.